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BLINDSIGHT: HOW WE SEE DISABILITIES IN TORT 
LITIGATION 
Anne Bloom* with Paul Steven Miller** 
Abstract: Tort litigation operates with a distorted perspective of disability. It suffers from 
blindsight; it does not see people with disabilities the way they see themselves. Disability 
advocates emphasize that most people with disabilities lead happy lives. Deeply rooted 
biases, however, make it difficult for this perspective to be recognized. Tort litigation’s 
heavy emphasis on medical testimony and its repeated portrayal of plaintiffs as “less than 
whole” over-emphasize the physical aspects of disability and unfairly depict people with 
disabilities as tragic. When legal actors embrace these views, they reinforce harmful 
stereotypes outside the courthouse doors. Newly disabled plaintiffs are also likely to 
internalize this distorted perspective, as they are repeatedly exposed to it in the course of the 
litigation. This Article recommends several ways that tort litigation can present plaintiffs 
with disabilities in more empowering ways, while still recognizing the severity of the injuries 
involved, and without sacrificing the recovery of hedonic damages or otherwise reducing the 
plaintiffs’ awards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Was not experience necessary to see? 
— Dr. Oliver Sacks1 
 
In 1993, Dr. Oliver Sacks introduced The New Yorker readers to a 
condition called “blindsight.”2 Blindsight is a kind of perceptual 
blindness.3 People with blindsight have the ability to see but are not 
conscious of it.4 Essentially, they are blinded by the limitations of their 
cognitive experience. As the great Irish playwright Brian Friel has taught 
us, however, blindsight can also be understood as a cultural condition.5 
In Molly Sweeney, a play Friel wrote after reading Sacks’ article,6 Friel 
portrays society as suffering from blindsight in its interactions with 
people with disabilities.7 While people without disabilities can 
physically see the lives of people with disabilities, Friel suggests, their 
biases make them blind to how individuals actually experience 
disability.8 
                                                     
1. Oliver Sacks, A Neurologists’ Notebook, To See and Not See, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 
1993, at 59 (emphasis in original).  
2. Id. at 72. 
3. Id. (“Visual signals are perceived and are responded to appropriately, but nothing of this 
perception reaches consciousness at all.”). 
4. Id. 
5. BRIAN FRIEL, MOLLY SWEENEY (1994). Molly Sweeney retells a story that was originally told 
by Dr. Oliver Sacks about a blind person who undergoes surgery to restore vision lost in childhood. 
See Carole-Ann Upton, Visions of the Sightless in Friel’s Molly Sweeney and Synge’s The Well of 
the Saints, 40.3 MODERN DRAMA 347, 347–48 (1997) (explaining the relationship between Friel’s 
play and Sacks’ true story). In both versions of the story, the surgery is successful but the patient 
later suffers from “blindsight.” FRIEL, supra; Sacks, supra note 1, at 72. In Friel’s version of the 
story, however, blindsight is also a cultural condition, afflicting the people around the patient who 
are blind to their biases about the quality of the patient’s life before surgery. Upton, supra.   
6. See Upton, supra note 5, at 347–48, 357 (citing Programme Note, Brian Friel, British Premiere 
of Molly Sweeney, at the Almeida Theatre, London, opening Oct. 27, 1994). The programme 
acknowledged Oliver Sacks’ influence on the play.  
7. See Id. (describing Friel’s play and the social blindness of its seeing characters). 
8. Id. Friel illustrates the differences in how disabilities are perceived and how they are 
experienced with competing monologues from Molly, who is blind, and from both her husband and 
surgeon, who are not. Before Molly undergoes surgery to restore her vision, for example, Molly’s 
husband and doctor both express the view that she has “nothing to lose.” FRIEL, supra note 5, at 20 
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In this Article, I argue that tort litigation suffers from a similar 
condition. I do so mindful of the limitations of using medical 
terminology to critique biases about disability.9 Disability rights activists 
have long sought to have disability understood in social, rather than 
medical terms.10 In light of this history, my use of medical terminology 
to diagnose and treat tort litigation’s perspective on disability may seem 
ironic and potentially regressive. I also recognize that there are problems 
with using a disability metaphor, particularly one linked to blindness.11 
Disability metaphors can be offensive because they usually rely on 
negative stereotypes for their rhetorical power.12 Despite these 
limitations, however, I think blindsight is a useful metaphor for 
understanding both what is wrong with tort litigation’s current 
perspective on disability and how it needs to change. In part, this is 
because the term itself resists drawing lines between the “disabled” and 
“non-disabled” worlds. A person (or institution) with blindsight is 
neither “blind” nor “sighted,” but both. For related reasons, what a 
diagnosis of blindsight suggests is not treatment for “blindness” (or 
“sightedness”) but greater recognition of the limitations of our own 
perspectives. Finally, as I am using the term here, blindsight is a 
condition of the seemingly “non-disabled.” In this respect, my use of 
blindsight as a metaphor for tort litigation’s perspective on disabilities 
does not seek to reinforce negative stereotypes about people with 
disabilities but to turn them on their head.13 
                                                     
(quoting the character Mr. Rice, a surgeon who eventually performs surgery on Molly to restore her 
vision). Friel presents Molly’s perspective, however, quite differently. On the night before the 
surgery, her character says to the audience, “[H]ow can they know what they are taking away from 
me? How do they know what they are offering me? They don’t. They can’t. And have I anything to 
gain? Anything? Anything?” Id. at 23 (quoting the character Molly Sweeney). By repeatedly 
juxtaposing the characters’ different perspectives against each other, Friel effectively uses the play 
to expose and confront the audience’s blindsight about the lives of people with disabilities. See 
Upton, supra note 5, at 348 (suggesting that, in Friel’s account, it is society that suffers from 
blindness).  
9. For a thoughtful discussion of some of the limitations of using disability as metaphor, see Liat 
Ben-Moshe, Infusing Disability in the Curriculum: The Case of Saramago’s Blindness, 26 
DISABILITY STUDIES QUARTERLY No. 2 (2006). 
10. See, e.g., TOM SHAKESPEARE, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND WRONGS (2006). 
11. See Ben-Moshe, supra note 9, at 2. 
12. See id.  
13. Another way to put it is to say that my use of medical terms and practices is intentional and 
strategic. By employing the “master’s tools,” I seek to expose both the culturally mediated character 
of the tools and the power dynamics that they conceal. See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
Celebrating Critical Race Theory at 20, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1497, 1501 (2009) (citing Audre Lorde, 
The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND 
SPEECHES 110, 112 (1984)) (describing the technique of using the “master’s tools” as a political 
 
WLR_Bloom_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/9/2011 8:26 AM 
712 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:709 
 
Tort litigation’s blindsight stems from its assumption that the lives of 
people with disabilities are tragic.14 This perspective is blindsighted 
because people with disabilities do not tend to share this assessment of 
their lives; in their view, a life with a disability is no more or less tragic 
than a life without one.15 Despite the best efforts of disability activists, 
however, the widespread perception of disability as tragedy persists.16 In 
tort litigation, the intransigence of this distorted perspective is especially 
remarkable. Because plaintiffs must have suffered a physical injury in 
order to recover on most tort claims, legal actors in tort litigation 
encounter people with physical disabilities on a regular basis.17 Despite 
this regular interaction, however, tort litigation does not see people with 
physical disabilities the way they see themselves.18 The cost of this 
blindsight is high. Tort cases are currently litigated on the basis of 
assumptions that do not comport with the actual experiences of people 
                                                     
strategy). 
14. For a similar argument in the context of hedonic damages, see Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo 
Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 771–72 
(2007). See also Sagit Mor, A Disability Critique of Torts: Preliminary Directions, presented at the 
Annual Meetings of the Law and Society Association, June, 2011, San Francisco, CA (on file with 
the author) (criticizing tort litigation’s role in generating stigmatizing assumptions). 
15. Perhaps because of this, it is a fairly common experience for people with physical 
impairments to find it difficult to identify as “disabled.” See EXPLORING DISABILITY: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 50–62 (Colin Barnes et al. eds., 1999). 
16. For an overview of the problem, see MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT 
(1990). See also Simon Brisenden, Independent Living and the Medical Model of Disability (1986), 
reprinted in THE DISABILITY READER: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 23 (Tom Shakespeare ed., 
1998). For a discussion of the issue in the torts context, see Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, 
at 749, 752–60, 778 (arguing that hedonic damages cases present a view of disability as personal 
tragedy). 
17. Legal actors in tort litigation encounter people with physical disabilities on a regular basis 
because of the role that physical harm plays in most tort claims. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1650 [hereinafter Unrealized Torts] 
(“Traumatic bodily harm and illness are the paradigmatic forms of ultimate harm [in tort law].”); 
see also MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, 
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 89 (2010) (noting that negligence, the dominant theory in tort law, 
extends only to physical harm and property damage). 
18. Because injuries involving mental disabilities raise different issues, my arguments here are 
restricted to plaintiffs with physical disabilities. For a discussion of some of the challenges posed by 
mental disabilities, see Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental 
Disability Law, Theory and Practice, “Us” and “Them,” 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 785–90 (1998) 
(describing some of the more prevalent stereotypes about people with mental disabilities). See also 
Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 
94 GEO L.J. 399, 422–30 (2006) (noting important differences between physical and mental 
disabilities in the context of hedonic loss); Harry J.F. Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled 
Tort Defendants, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1995) (noting that tort litigation treats defendants 
with mental disabilities differently from defendants with physical disabilities).  
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with disabilities.19 This leads to distorted analyses and outcomes.20 
Perhaps more worrisome, tort litigation’s distorted perspective fosters 
troubling stereotypes and encourages plaintiffs with disabling injuries to 
view themselves in harmful ways.21 
Although tort litigation’s blindsight is deeply ingrained, tort litigation 
could operate effectively with a different perspective. Instead of 
portraying plaintiffs as “tragedies,” legal actors in tort litigation could 
present their clients’ disabling injuries in more complex ways that better 
reflect people with disabilities’ actual experiences. Moreover, it is 
possible for tort litigation to make these changes without sacrificing its 
historic role of providing compensation for people with severe injuries.22 
Recognizing the extent of our blindsight is the first step. As Dr. Sacks 
suggests in the quotation that appears at the beginning of this Article, 
“[E]xperience [is] necessary to see.”23 Most legal actors in tort litigation, 
however, have little to no personal experience with disabilities.24 If we 
want to understand the extent of tort litigation’s blindsight, we need to 
acknowledge this experiential deficit and how it is currently preventing 
tort litigation from delivering just results. 
Because legal actors in tort litigation have failed to consider the real-
life experiences of people with disabilities for so long, it is difficult to 
imagine how tort litigation might proceed differently if their experiences 
                                                     
19. Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157, S173–S175 (2008). 
20. Id. at S175–S177 (summarizing the literature on affective forecasting (predicting a person’s 
future sense of well-being) and noting that, when people without disabilities do not understand the 
experiences of people with disabilities, they are likely to exaggerate the effects of some losses and 
minimize the effects of others). 
21. See discussion infra Part II; see also Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 784–87 
(making a similar argument in the context of hedonic damages). 
22. For a summary of the role of tort litigation in providing compensation of injuries, see DAN B. 
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 17 (2000).  
23. See Sacks, supra note 1, at 59. Brian Friel makes a similar suggestion in his play, Molly 
Sweeney. See Upton, supra note 5, at 351–52 (describing how Friel’s protagonist sees best when she 
becomes aware of her own limited experience). Research on affective forecasting provides 
empirical support for Sacks’ and Upton’s observation. See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON 
HAPPINESS 185–88 (2006) (summarizing the relevant research and concluding that experience 
provides uniquely valuable insight into the experience of pain and suffering).  
24. According to a recent American Bar Association (ABA) report, only about one in twenty 
lawyers report having a disability, as compared to about one in five people reporting a disability 
nationwide. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA DISABILITY STATISTICS REPORT (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/disability/PublicDocuments/ABADisability
StatisticsReport.authcheckdam.pdf. What counts as “disability,” however, is not always clear; the 
category is highly permeable in the sense that anyone can fall in or out of disability at any time. See 
generally Elizabeth Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and the ADA Amendments 
Act 17 (Oct. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).  
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were considered. We can begin, however, by learning more about how 
the experiences of people with disabling injuries differ from the 
assumptions about disabilities that govern our current practices. As it 
turns out, tort litigation provides us with a somewhat unique opportunity 
to do this. Many tort plaintiffs have suffered disabling injuries,25 and in 
most instances, the litigation takes place while the plaintiffs are in a 
period of transition.26 While their lawyers file claims, tort plaintiffs with 
disabling injuries are still recovering and adjusting to life with a 
disability. As tort litigation travels alongside these plaintiffs in their 
journey, we have a chance to learn something about the complex—and 
undoubtedly variable—experience of becoming designated as a person 
with a disability. If legal actors in tort litigation want to understand, and 
ultimately overcome, their blindsight, tort litigation should provide more 
opportunity for plaintiffs and others with disabilities to share their 
experiences.27 
While engaging more with people with disabilities is important, legal 
actors in tort litigation can and should do much more. Tort litigation is 
not simply a witness to the transition of newly injured plaintiffs; it also 
plays an active role in shaping their changing identities. As a result, how 
legal actors portray people with disabilities in tort litigation has broader 
social implications. Legal actors in tort litigation need to be much more 
attentive to the ways in which tort litigation’s blindsight harms people 
with disabilities and, ultimately, do something to stop it. 
What follows is an attempt to come to terms with the extent of legal 
actors’ blindsight in tort litigation, including its effects on plaintiffs with 
disabilities and the broader public discourse. Because it is not enough 
simply to expose the problem, I also offer some solutions. I do so 
mindful of my own blindsight—the ways in which I, too, am constrained 
                                                     
25. There are apparently no studies of the number of plaintiffs with physical disabilities in tort 
litigation. The numbers are significant enough, however, to merit serious consideration of how tort 
litigation portrays disabilities. See, e.g., Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 745 (analyzing 
hedonic damage awards to people with disabilities in tort cases); John Bronsteen et al., Hedonic 
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1516 (2008) (discussing 
hedonic damage awards involving people with disabilities in tort cases); Sunstein, supra note 19, at 
S173–S175 (expressing concern about damage awards to people with disabilities in tort cases). 
26. It is widely acknowledged that many plaintiffs with disabling injuries are in a period of 
transition during tort litigation, as they adjust to their new identities. See, e.g., Bagenstos & 
Schlanger, supra note 14, at 785 (describing the changes that a plaintiff with disabling changes 
likely goes through during and after litigation); Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1536–38 
(describing the adaptation process that tort plaintiffs go through in the period before trial).  
27. See Sagit Mor, Between Charity, Welfare, and Warfare: A Disability Legal Studies Analysis 
of Privilege and Neglect in Israeli Disability Policy, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 63, 73 (2006) 
(arguing for more research on the role of law in the social construction of disability). 
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by the limitations of my own experience. Thus, both the critiques and the 
“fixes” are an invitation to further dialogue and should be read in that 
light. 
Part I of this Article compares tort litigation’s portrayal of disability 
with the perspective of disability activists to expose the extent of tort 
litigation’s blindsight. While most disability advocates emphasize the 
social and political aspects of disability, tort litigation treats disability as 
if it were a solely medical phenomenon. Part I describes these different 
approaches in the context of the contrasting social and medical models 
of disability and argues that tort litigation currently proceeds in ways 
that more closely approximate the medical model.28 Consistent with the 
medical model, legal actors in tort litigation place excessive emphasis on 
the physical aspects of plaintiffs’ injuries and tend to pathologize even 
average bodies. These practices, in turn, produce a distorted view of 
disability, which ignores the role of social prejudice in interpreting 
injuries as disabling conditions. 
Part II explains why tort litigation’s distorted approach to disability 
poses problems beyond the courthouse doors. It discusses the socially 
harmful effects of current practices and expresses concern about how 
messages about disability that are generated in tort litigation may 
become part of our broader cultural discourse. Among other things, tort 
litigation’s distorted perspective of disability provides political and 
cultural legitimacy for harmful stereotypes about people with 
disabilities. These harmful stereotypes, in turn, help to construct the 
experience of being disabled in our culture. 
Part III argues that things could be different. It proposes changes that 
would allow legal actors in tort litigation to confront their blindsight and 
play a more constructive role in public discourse about disabilities. One 
proposed change is to create more opportunities in tort litigation for 
people with disabilities to discuss their own experiences with 
impairment. A second proposed change is to take steps to ensure that 
judges and lawyers portray plaintiffs with disabilities in less tragic ways. 
To that end, Part III offers several alternative narratives that would 
present plaintiffs with disabilities in a more realistic light. Finally, Part 
III argues that these changes can be made without lowering the 
plaintiffs’ recoveries. Because juries tend to award more for outrage than 
they award for pity,29 reframing tort litigation in ways that portray 
                                                     
28. For an overview of the two models, see SHAKESPEARE, supra note 10, at 15–18  
29. See Chris O’Brien & Christine Funk, Put Jurors on Mission for Justice, TRIAL, Apr. 2010, at 
20.  
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plaintiffs in empowering ways will not necessarily result in lower 
verdicts, especially if plaintiffs’ lawyers reframe the litigation in ways 
that emphasize the outrageousness of the defendants’ conduct. 
Ultimately, the Article concludes that, regardless of the potential 
impact on recovery, tort litigation must begin to move in a direction that 
acknowledges and respects the full humanity of people with disabling 
physical injuries. Legal actors in tort litigation should not portray 
plaintiffs with disabling injuries as tragic when most people with 
disabling injuries do not experience their own lives in that way. If legal 
actors in tort litigation can acknowledge their blindsight and engage 
more directly with the real-life experiences of people with disabilities, 
tort litigation will begin to become a space where both newly injured 
plaintiffs and others learn to view disability in a less tragic light. 
I.  TORT LITIGATION’S DISTORTED VIEW OF DISABILITY 
What kind of system bids us each to make of our bodies a 
problem to be solved, a claim we must defend, or a secret we 
must publicly confess, again and again? 
— Riki Anne Wilchins30 
 
Legal actors in tort litigation treat people with disabling injuries as if 
their bodies, rather than defendants’ conduct, were on trial. The 
excessive attention to plaintiffs’ bodies stems, in part, from tort 
litigation’s commitment to a particular understanding of injury. In tort 
litigation, physical harm is generally considered to be more important 
than social or emotional harm.31 In most cases, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that they have suffered physical harm before they can 
recover damages.32 While there are many reasons why legal actors in tort 
litigation approach injury in this way,33 one of the unfortunate side 
effects is a constant focus on plaintiffs’ bodies at the expense of other 
                                                     
30.  Riki Anne Wilchins, What Does it Cost to Tell the Truth?, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES 
READER 547, 550 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006) (paraphrasing Foucault). 
31. On the significance of physical harm in tort litigation, see Anne Bloom, Zen and the Art of 
Tort Litigation, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 11, 19 (2011). See also CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 
17, at 90 describing tort law’s emphasis on bodily harm); Unrealized Torts, supra note 17, at 1650 
(noting the importance of bodily harm in tort law).  
32. DOBBS, supra note 22, at 1115; see also Unrealized Torts, supra note 17, at 1626 (noting how 
courts hearing tort cases struggle with claims that do not involve bodily harm).  
33. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 17, at 90 (explaining that tort law’s emphasis on 
bodily harm stems from concerns about malingering or fraud and a belief that bodily harm is easier 
to verify than emotional harm).  
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issues in the case. For plaintiffs with physically disabling injuries, the 
attention to the body is particularly intense. Legal actors in tort litigation 
tend to view disabling injuries as strictly medical conditions.34 This leads 
them to focus heavily on identifying and treating plaintiffs’ bodily 
limitations in their preparation, presentation, and analysis of cases.35 
From a disability rights perspective, this extreme focus on plaintiffs’ 
bodies overlooks important aspects of a disabling injury.36 While there 
may be many physical issues associated with disability, the main 
problem that most people with disabilities face is not their bodies but 
social oppression.37 A person with a spinal injury, for example, faces 
less of a challenge from walking than from social discrimination and the 
inability to gain access to many buildings with a wheelchair.38 Thus, 
from a disability rights perspective, when a person suffers a disabling 
injury, social and environmental factors play a significant role in 
creating the condition of being designated as disabled.39 
In the scholarly literature, two theoretical frameworks represent these 
different ways of thinking about disability.40 The “medical model” of 
disability views disability as an illness or a disease that requires a 
medical intervention and solution.41 The “social model” of disability, in 
                                                     
34. For a similar argument in the context of genetic interventions, see Brigham A. Fordham, 
Disability and Designer Babies: Rethinking the Debate Over Genetic Interventions in Favor of 
Disability, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1473, 1499–502 (2011). 
35. See, e.g., Alicia R. Ouellette, Insult to Injury: A Disability-Sensitive Response to Smolensky’s 
Call for Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L. J. 397, 
400 (2008) (describing how the medical view of disability emphasizes treating impairments rather 
than alleviating the social oppression of people with disabilities). 
36. TOM SHAKESPEARE ET AL., THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF DISABILITY 2 (1996).  
37. Id.  
38. Id. 
39. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Disability Rights, Disability Discrimination, and Social Insurance, 
25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 575, 575 (2009) (“[P]hysical or mental conditions do not disable; barriers 
created by the environment or by social attitudes keep persons with physical or mental differences 
from participating in society as equals.”); see also Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social 
Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251 (2007).  
40. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 10, at 15–18. As Shakespeare notes, there are many other ways of 
conceptualizing disability but the medical and social models are the dominant models. Id. at 15–26 
(describing different ways of understanding disability); see also Aart C. Hendriks, Different 
Definition-Same Problems-One Way Out?, in DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY: 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 195, 202 (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Yee eds., 
2002) (describing the “minority-group model” and noting its close relationship to the social model); 
Weber, supra note 39, at 575, 593 (discussing the “civil rights model” and noting that it 
incorporates the “basic insight about how the social environment or attitude interacts with physical 
or mental traits of individuals to cause ‘disability’”). 
41. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 10, at 15; see also Fordham, supra note 34, at 1473, 1497 
(describing the medical model); Ouellette, supra note 35, at 397, 400 (same). 
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contrast, views disability as a social construct.42 From this perspective, 
medical conditions do not create disability; rather, they are the product 
of a society that defines some people with bodily differences as “not 
normal.”43 In practice, the medical model focuses on providing medical 
solutions to fit people with bodily differences to society.44 In other 
words, the medical model focuses on “fixing” bodies, rather than 
addressing the environmental and social conditions that cause people to 
be considered disabled. The social model, on the other hand, asks society 
to make changes to fit different types of bodies.45 Moreover, because the 
social model identifies the “problem” as societal discrimination and 
infrastructure limitations, it also maintains that the experience of 
disability depends greatly upon the particular social context in which 
people live and function—including any institutional, structural, and 
attitudinal barriers.46 
Beginning in the late 1960s, disability activists began to criticize the 
medical model of disability.47 These criticisms expressed particular 
concern about the relationship between the medical model and the 
presentation of disability as “tragedy.”48 Disability advocates pointed out 
                                                     
42. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 10, at 18; see also Brisenden, supra note 16, at 23 (“On the whole, 
it is the organization of society, its material construction and the attitudes of individuals within it, 
that results in certain people being dis-abled.”).  
43. See Brisenden, supra note 16, at 22 (“The word ‘disabled’ is used as a blanket term to cover a 
large number of people who have nothing in common with each other, except that they do not 
function in exactly the way as those people who are called ‘normal.’”); see also Fordham, supra 
note 34, at 1502 (“This social model of disability recognizes that, for most people with disabilities, 
discrimination is a much greater obstacle than any physical impairment.”). 
44. See Fordham, supra note 34, at 1502 n.185; Ouellette, supra note 35, at 400; Paul Steven 
Miller, Avoiding Genetic Genocide: Understanding Good Intentions and Eugenics in the Complex 
Dialogue Between the Medical and Disability Communities 20 (Dec. 10, 2008), available at 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1202682. 
45. Fordham, supra note 34, at 1498; Miller, supra note 44, at 20. 
46. See Miller, supra note 44, at 20; see also Brisenden, supra note 16, at 23–25 (explaining how 
social and environmental conditions play a significant role in the experience of disability).  
47. One of the first such critiques came from Paul Hunt. See Paul Hunt, A Critical Condition 
(1966), reprinted in THE DISABILITY READER: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 7, 9 (Tom 
Shakespeare ed., 1998). At the same time, disability rights organizations also began to adopt 
definitions of disability that emphasized the social components of disability. See, e.g., Union of the 
Physically Impaired Against Segregation, Fundamental Principles of Disability (Oct. 1997), 
available at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-studies/archiveuk/UPIAS/fundamental%20principles.
pdf (“Physical disability is therefore a particular form of social oppression.”); see also The 
European Day of Disabled Persons, Report of the Human Rights Plenary Meeting, Dec. 3, 1994 
(defining a disabled person as “an individual . . . . in a disabling situation, brought about by 
environmental, economic and social barriers . . . .”).  
48. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 10, at 15; see also Hunt, supra note 47, at 9 (critiquing the 
portrayal of people with disabilities as tragic).  
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that life with a disability is no more tragic than a life without a 
disability.49 Activists also urged policymakers to shift attention away 
from the medical model’s focus on physical impairments and focus more 
closely on the cultural and political aspects of disability.50 In many 
arenas, disability activists successfully influenced policymakers. For 
example, legislators drafted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
with a social perspective of disability in mind.51 At the urging of 
disability rights activists, the ADA focused less on identifying and 
treating people with disabilities and more on encouraging a more 
inclusive view of people with disabilities.52 
In contrast to developments in other areas of public policy, however, 
tort litigation continues to utilize a medical model of disability.53 Some 
of the problems with this reliance have already been documented. In an 
important early work, for example, Wendy Hensel showed how tort 
claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life presume that a life with 
certain types of physical impairments is not worth living, even though 
people with severe disabilities often report that they live rich and 
meaningful lives.54 More recently, others noted similar biases in the 
                                                     
49. Hunt, supra note 47, at 9. 
50. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 10, at 18.  
51. Fordham, supra note 34, at 1502 (“The social model of disability provided the basis for 
disability rights legislation, like the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, which introduced a 
definition of disability that, in part, recognized the social construction of disability.”); see also 
Kerry T. Cooperman, The Handicapping Effect of Judicial Opinions in Reproductive Tort Cases: 
Correcting the Legal Perception of Persons with Disabilities, 68 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 1, 1 
(2008) (noting that disability activists were major players in the passage of the ADA). The 2008 
Amendments to the ADA emphasize the social aspects of disability even more clearly than the 
original law. See, e.g., Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. LAW 203, 279 (2010) 
(stating that the Amendments’ new “regarded as” prong “paves the way toward a broader 
conception of the social model of disability . . . .”). 
52. See Mark C. Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive Rights: A 
Preliminary Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 278–79 (2004) (describing full integration 
as the goal of the ADA). While some judges still operate with the mindset of the medical model, the 
overall trend of thinking about disability in the civil rights context moves away from the medical 
model. Fordham, supra note 34, at 1498; see also Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under 
Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000) (describing problems with how the ADA has been 
interpreted). 
53. See, e.g., Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 752–60 (describing tort litigation’s 
adherence to the medical model in the context of hedonic damages and the resulting problems of 
stereotyping and stigma).  
54. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 173 (2005).  
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debate over liability for genetic interventions.55 
While genetic testing and selection have gone on for some time, 
concern arose in the academic community following reports that some 
parents sought to select traits associated with disability, like Deafness56 
or short stature.57 Citing the reports, one scholar argued that liability 
should be imposed for the selection of traits associated with disability on 
the ground that certain types of physical disabilities are likely to be 
considered offensive to a person with “a reasonable sense of personal 
dignity.”58 As critics pointed out, however, the argument assumes that 
“reasonable” people view physical disabilities as tragic—one of the 
central (and most heavily criticized) tenets of the medical model, and a 
view that many people with disabilities reject.59 
A number of scholars have also drawn attention to how disabilities 
are portrayed in claims for hedonic damages.60 Hedonic damage claims 
purport to compensate plaintiffs for the “lost enjoyment of life.”61 Not 
                                                     
55. See Fordham, supra note 34, at 1473 (providing an overview of the debates); see also 
Ouellette, supra note 35, at 398, 403–05 (noting that the focus of the debate is on conditions 
perceived to be disabling, rather than other types of traits, like sexual orientation or race).  
56. The “D” in “Deafness” is capitalized to recognize that Deafness is understood by many Deaf 
people to be a cultural attribute, rather than a disability. See generally Edward Dolnick, Deafness as 
Culture, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1993, at 37–38. 
57. See Fordham, supra note 34, at 1476 (providing an overview of the debates).  
58. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for 
Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 309–12, 320 (2008) (arguing that 
parents should be liable for the selection of genetic traits associated with conditions defined as 
disabilities under the ADA); see also id. at 319–20 (arguing that “genetic traits such as deafness 
[sic] or achondroplasia [dwarfness] are almost certain to be considered offensive to a reasonable 
sense of personal dignity”).  
59. See Ouellette, supra note 35, at 400 (explaining that arguments in favor of liability for genetic 
intervention rely on a medical model of disability); see also Fordham, supra note 34, at 1494 n.129 
(making the additional point that arguments in favor of liability for genetic interventions conflate 
the offense of changing someone’s physical attributes without their permission with the attributes 
themselves). 
60. See, e.g., Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 745; Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 
516; Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science of Happiness, 85 IND. 
L.J. 553 (2010). 
61. Jurisdictions vary in their approach to hedonic damages. Some do not allow the claims at all, 
see, e.g., Sullivan v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 862 F. Supp. 317 (D. Kan. 1994); some permit hedonic 
damages to be compensated as part of a pain and suffering award, see, e.g., Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 
102 P.3d 52, 64 (Nev. 2004); others recognize hedonic damages as a separate category of 
recovery—sometimes called “disability” damages, see, e.g., Knight v. Lord, 648 N.E.2d 617, 623 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995). Still others make recovery contingent on the plaintiff having some cognitive 
awareness of the loss, whether it is considered as part of an award for loss of enjoyment of life, see, 
e.g., McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 255 (1989), or compensable as a separate award. For an 
overview of this somewhat jumbled area of law, see David Polin, Damages for Loss of Enjoyment of 
Life, in 49 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 339 (1998).  
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all jurisdictions permit hedonic damage claims but, in the jurisdictions 
where they are allowed, courts permit a jury to presume that plaintiffs 
with disabilities will experience less pleasure in their life and to award 
hedonic damages on that basis.62 Like the assumptions utilized by courts 
in wrongful life and wrongful birth cases, the practice ignores the real-
life experiences of people with disabilities, who do not report a 
diminished capacity for pleasure.63 
In each of these areas, greater attention to the gap between tort 
practices and the actual experience of disability has brought greater 
understanding of how blindsight clouds the perspective of legal actors in 
tort litigation. Yet, if these three examples—wrongful birth/life claims, 
liability for genetic intervention, and hedonic damages—represented the 
full extent of tort litigation’s blindsight, the problem might not seem 
terribly serious. Claims for wrongful birth and wrongful life are 
relatively infrequent;64 the debate over liability for genetic intervention 
is largely theoretical;65 and some jurisdictions do not recognize hedonic 
damage claims.66 Tort litigation’s distorted perspective of disability, 
however, extends much further than these three types of claims.67 
Two very common practices in tort litigation deserve particular 
attention. The first is the heavy reliance on medical experts in most 
personal injury cases.68 The second is tort litigation’s emphasis on 
“making the plaintiff whole.”69 Both practices rely upon the medical 
model’s distorted view of disability in the litigation of tort claims. When 
we examine them more closely, we see that the problem is not simply 
that legal actors in tort litigation do not see people with disabilities the 
way they see themselves; tort litigation’s distorted perspective of 
disability structures the way litigators currently practice personal injury 
                                                     
62. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 748–49. 
63. Id. at 749. 
64. See Hensel, supra note 54, at 160 (noting that the number of wrongful birth and wrongful life 
claims seems to be diminishing, perhaps because of the expansion of abortion rights and improved 
prenatal testing).  
65. See Ouellette, supra note 35, at 398 n.4 (noting that the technology to permit genetic 
interventions does not yet exist); see also Fordham, supra n. 34, at 1480 (explaining that there are 
very few reported cases of parents selecting embryos with traits associated with disability).  
66. See, e.g., Sullivan, 862 F. Supp. 317; Carroll v. United States, 295 Fed. Appx. 382 (2d Cir. 
2008) (applying New York law).  
67. See, e.g., Mor, supra note 14 (criticizing tort litigation’s approach to disabilities). 
68. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 189 (5th ed. 1984). 
69. Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1538 (noting that references to making the plaintiff 
“whole” are part of the “typical parlance” of tort cases); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Who Feels 
Their Pain? The Challenge of Noneconomic Damages in Civil Litigation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 
435–36 (2006).  
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law. Consequently, tort litigation’s blindsight has far-reaching 
implications. 
A.  The Pathologizing Role of Medical Experts 
Medical experts play a privileged role in personal injury cases.70 The 
reason for this has partly to do with tort litigation’s emphasis on bodily 
harm.71 Most personal injury claims require evidence of bodily injury to 
state a claim.72 Medical experts can provide testimony on both the 
existence of bodily harm and the extent of plaintiffs’ injuries.73 Many 
lawyers also believe that medical experts increase the likelihood of a 
good outcome.74 Indeed, their testimony is considered so important that 
it is rare for personal injury litigation to proceed without them.75 
The case of Bailey v. Ford and Firestone illustrates the significance 
of bodily harm in tort litigation and the role that medical experts play in 
many tort cases.76 In 2000, Donna Bailey sued Ford and Firestone after a 
car accident left her paralyzed.77 There was no dispute that Bailey was 
seriously injured in the accident and neither defendant challenged her 
claim of significant bodily harm.78 Instead, the legal focus of the case 
                                                     
70. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, at 89; see also Anne Bloom, To Be Real: Sexual Identity 
Politics in Tort Litigation, 88 N.C. L. REV. 357, 410–13 (2010) (describing the heavy reliance on 
medical experts in tort litigation).  
71. See Bloom, supra note 31, at 19 (describing tort litigation’s emphasis on the body and the role 
of medical experts in evaluating bodily harm). 
72. See Unrealized Torts, supra note 17, at 1626 (noting that courts struggle with tort claims that 
do not involve bodily harm). This is true even with tort claims for emotional distress, which 
typically require that the plaintiff show some sort of bodily manifestation of harm. See Dobbs, supra 
note 22, at 1115. The one exception is defamation law. See id. at 1117. 
73. KEETON ET AL., supra note 68, at 189; see also Richard Goodman, Expert Medical 
Testimony: A Physician’s Advice to Counsel, N.J. LAW. MAG., Aug. 2004 (describing the role of 
doctors in providing expert testimony). 
74. Goodman, supra note 73, at 25. 
75. See id. (“Particularly in personal injury and in medical malpractice cases, the presence of a 
physician or doctor as an expert witness is common during the pre-trial investigative stage of a case, 
as well as during the presentation of the case itself in a courtroom.”); David L. Merideth, The 
Medical Expert Witness in Mississippi: Outgunning the Opposition, 64 MISS. L.J. 85, 85 (noting 
that attorneys commonly hire medical experts in medical malpractice cases, personal injury suits, 
and workers’ compensation claims and also noting that the use of and role of medical experts is 
expanding).  
76. The case is featured in a best-selling book. ADAM PENENBERG, TRAGIC INDIFFERENCE: ONE 
MAN’S BATTLE WITH THE AUTO INDUSTRY OVER THE DANGER OF SUVS 14–20 (2003) (describing 
the facts of the case).  
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 110–13 (describing Bailey’s injuries); see also id. at 235 (describing the filing of the 
complaint in the Bailey case and the defendants’ response). 
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was on the cause of Bailey’s injuries. Plaintiffs alleged that the defective 
design of the Ford Explorer, in which Bailey was a passenger, and the 
Firestone tires on the vehicle caused Bailey’s injuries.79 Defendants, on 
the other hand, explored alternative theories of causation, including 
driver negligence and negligent handling of Bailey’s body by rescuers 
after the crash.80 
Under any of these theories, the condition of Bailey’s body after the 
accident had little to do with the main legal issues in the case.81 
Nevertheless, Bailey’s attorneys focused on the condition of her body 
from the earliest stages of the litigation. At their very first meeting, 
Bailey’s lead attorney “couldn’t resist” looking at Bailey’s body and 
immediately began thinking about “[h]ow much would it take for him to 
change places with her?”82 During that meeting, the attorney explained 
to Bailey that she would become a “focal point” in the Ford–Firestone 
litigation and put a “human face on the tragedy” that results when 
companies put defectively designed products on the market.83 
Consistent with this strategy, Bailey’s attorneys proceeded to prepare 
for trial with the idea that Bailey’s physical impairments would play a 
central role. As is frequently the case in personal injury practice, 
Bailey’s attorneys hired medical experts to provide detailed testimony 
                                                     
79. Id. at 233–34.  
80. Id. at 263–72 (describing the theory of driver error).  See also id. at 270 (summarizing defense 
counsels’ questioning of a key rescuer during her deposition). 
81. As in other “rollover” litigation involving the design of the Ford Explorer and Firestone’s 
tires, the main issues in the Bailey case concerned the design of the defendants’ products. See id. at 
21–48, 70–83 (describing the strategy of plaintiffs’ counsel in Ford “rollover” cases); id. at 123–36 
(describing the defendants’ response to the litigation). The only scenario under which the condition 
of Bailey’s body was even marginally relevant to the main legal issues in the case was the defense’s 
suggestion that Bailey’s paralysis may have been caused by a rescuer’s failure to secure Bailey’s 
neck during the rescue. Id. at 270. For purposes of raising this defense, the condition of Bailey’s 
body immediately after the accident (and before she was transported) might have been relevant for 
purposes of determining whether she was already paralyzed when she was moved. Id. Bailey’s 
current medical condition, however, would not have been important even for this theory of the case, 
once the fact of her injuries was established. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1545 (noting that 
once the nature of the plaintiff’s injuries are known, the plaintiff’s health is of little importance in 
tort litigation).  
82. PENENBERG, supra note 76, at 249. 
83. Id. This interaction between Bailey and her lawyer reveals how a lawyer’s biases about the 
experience of disability can color the course of the litigation from the very start. From the moment 
he met her, Bailey’s attorney perceived her disabilities as a “tragedy.” Had he perceived her 
differently, he might have approached the litigation in a different way. For example, instead of 
making Bailey the “focal point” of the litigation, the lawyer might have focused on corporate 
executives at Ford and Firestone to provide a “human face” for the issues at stake. See discussion 
infra Part III. 
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about her impairments and Bailey’s likely future needs.84 It is also clear, 
however, that Bailey’s attorneys intended to use medical experts to play 
a more atmospheric role. The trial strategy, for example, included a plan 
to present Bailey to the jury with a “team of doctors at her side.”85 While 
Bailey’s attorneys did not ignore the legal issues in the case, they framed 
the case around the condition of Bailey’s body, even though there was 
absolutely no dispute about the seriousness of her injuries. Meanwhile, 
other aspects of the case, such as the role of the defendants’ products in 
causing the injuries, received relatively less attention in the framing of 
the litigation.86 
This emphasis on the body, even in the absence of significant disputes 
over whether the plaintiff is injured, is common in tort litigation. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers believe that they must arouse the jury’s pity in order 
to succeed in the case and they think that images of plaintiffs’ 
impairments will help them to do that.87 As a result, most trial lawyers 
develop trial themes that portray plaintiffs’ bodies in negative ways.88 A 
guide for plaintiffs’ lawyers, for example, recommends themes such as: 
“[t]his is a case about broken bones but also broken dreams”; “[s]he is a 
prisoner in her own body”; “[s]he used to be so beautiful. All of her 
friends envied her. Now they pity her”; and even “[y]ou break it, you 
bought it” (referring to the plaintiff’s body).89 
                                                     
84. On the role of medical experts in personal injury litigation, see Robert Sullivan & Bob 
Langdon, Developing Memorable Expert Testimony, TRIAL, Oct. 2008, at 44–45 (describing the role 
of experts in personal injury cases). For a discussion of the role that they played in Bailey’s case, 
see PENENBERG, supra note 76, at 262 (quoting medical expert testifying that Bailey would need 
constant assistance and supervision for the rest of her life and estimating the costs of that treatment). 
85. PENENBERG, supra note 76, at 281. 
86. See, e.g., Michael Winerip, Ford and Firestone Settle Suit Over Explorer Crash, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 9, 2001, at C1 (discussing the Bailey settlement but only mentioning the legal issues in the case 
in the last sentence, and then only in a cursory way); see also PENENBERG, supra note 76, at 137–42 
(describing a reporter’s persistent attempts to interview Bailey’s attorney about the safety issues in 
the case). 
87. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 752–55 (providing examples of how plaintiffs’ 
lawyers seek to arouse jurors’ pity); Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1535 n.106 (“[T]he trial 
process requires that the plaintiff perform her disability in front of the jury . . . .”); see also 
Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 754 (noting that some practice manuals advise plaintiff’s 
lawyers to have the plaintiff not attend trial if there is some risk that the plaintiff will appear to be 
coping better than the jury might imagine). 
88. See, e.g., JOHN C. SHEA, TRIAL THEMES FOR THE INJURED PLAINTIFF 15–17, available at 
http://www.marksandharrison.com/pdf/Trial%20Themes.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). See 
generally Philip H. Corboy & Susan J. Schwartz, Pain and Suffering and Non-Economic Damages, 
in ATLA’s Litigation of Tort Claims Section 24, at 13 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. 
Cusimano eds., 2003) (suggesting an approach that emphasizes testimony from medical experts on 
the plaintiff’s limitations).  
89. See SHEA, supra note 88, at 14–17. Other suggested themes also resonate with the medical 
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Medical experts play an important role in articulating and promoting 
these themes.90 Tort litigation favors medical experts because they are 
believed to be more “objective” than other types of witnesses.91 
However, this faith in medical experts’ objectivity may be misplaced.92 
While medical experts have extensive training in the body’s medical 
aspects, their training comes with its own biases. These biases cause 
doctors to view disabilities in light of what they have been trained to 
see.93 Psychologists refer to medical experts’ predispositions as a 
“normality bias.”94 As Brian Friel suggests, however, the experts’ 
“normality bias” is also a form of blindsight.95 Like the characters in 
Friel’s play, medical experts in tort litigation perceive disabilities from 
the limited perspective of their own cultural experiences and 
expectations.96 In the case of disabilities, these experiences and 
expectations prejudice experts to view bodily differences as problems, 
even when the affected individuals may not view their own bodies that 
way.97 
Over the last several decades, this blindsight has become even more 
                                                     
model; for example, “This case is about a terrible tragedy.” Id. at 15; see also Gary Gober, Closing 
Argument: The Lawyers’ Crowning Achievement, TRIAL, Apr. 1998, at 70 (recommending 
arguments that emphasize the plaintiff’s physical limitations). 
90. See Corboy & Schwartz, supra note 88, at 13 (noting that medical experts will testify to the 
plaintiff’s physical limitations). 
91. See Bloom, supra note 31, at 22; see also Richard Goodman, Expert Medical Testimony: A 
Physicians Advice to Counsel, 229 N.J. LAW. 25 (2004) (describing the role of the medical expert in 
helping juries to reach fair and reasonable verdicts). 
92. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 17, at 127 (making a similar argument with respect to 
judges and jurors). 
93. Id. (noting how expert opinions are shaped by a “normality” bias); see also Carol J. Gill, 
Health Professionals, Disability, and Assisted Suicide: An Examination of Relevant Empirical 
Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 526, 530 (2000) (describing the disability 
biases of medical experts). 
94. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 17, at 127.  
95. See Upton, supra note 5 (describing the broader significance of blindsight in Friel’s Molly 
Sweeney). 
96. Hensel, supra note 54, at 185 (arguing that experts and jurors are “conditioned” to the 
medical model’s view of disability and are “unlikely to have insight into the potential richness” of 
the lives of people with disabilities).  
97. Gill, supra note 93, at 530 (“[H]ealth professionals significantly underestimate the quality of 
life of persons with disabilities.”); see also T. Benjamin Singer, From the Medical Gaze to Sublime 
Mutations: The Ethics of (Re)Viewing Non-normative Body Images, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES 
READER 607 (Susan Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006) (“Ways of seeing are deeply embedded 
in culture, and images by themselves are hard-pressed to alter their conditions of visual reception. 
Visual perception of non-normative bodies, in particular, have been shaped through countless 
structured acts of viewing in contexts that range from talk show spectacles to case studies of 
medical pathology.”) 
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pronounced, as the medical baselines for “normality” have shifted from 
the characteristics of an average body to medicalized conceptions of 
what “ideal” bodies should look like.98 “Normal” no longer means 
“natural” or even “what is commonly encountered”;99 instead, it is 
defined by a set of expectations about what bodies should look like.100 
Because very few (and perhaps no) bodies can fully comply with these 
idealized conceptions, even average bodies are pathologized and treated 
as “problems” that need solving.101 
The experts’ normality bias becomes part of the legal analyses in the 
litigation when legal actors in tort litigation rely on medical experts to 
provide testimony on plaintiffs’ injuries. Experts hired by both sides 
scrutinize plaintiffs’ bodies for signs of “abnormalities” and offer 
testimony about what treatment is required for the bodies to more 
closely approximate the idealized medical expectations.102 Tort law then 
relies on this testimony to determine who qualifies for compensation and 
calculate damage awards. Generally speaking, plaintiffs diagnosed as 
“abnormal” qualify for compensation (assuming they can prove the other 
issues in the case) and receive compensation in amounts that correspond 
to the costs of the treatment the doctors recommend.103 Thus, legal 
judgments in tort litigation rely heavily on idealized, medical 
understandings about what “normal” bodies should look like.104 But, of 
course, these legal judgments ignore the important role of cultural 
experience in shaping how medical experts come to view bodily 
differences, such as disabilities, as “abnormalities.”105 They also ignore 
the ways in which all of us—at different points in our lives, and perhaps 
always—fail to live up to these idealized norms.106 In both respects, tort 
                                                     
98. Robin Mackenzie, Somatechnics of Medico-Legal Taxonomies: Elective Amputation and 
Transableism, 16 MED. L. REV. 390, 390 (2008). 
99. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 70, at 361–62 (describing the shifting meanings of “normal” and 
“natural” in tort litigation); see also Fordham, supra note 34, at 1494 n.129, 1515 (noting that 
experts and others sometimes equate “unusual” with “abnormal”).  
100. See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 70, at 361–62.  
101. Mackenzie, supra note 98, at 391. 
102. Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1545; see also Hensel, supra note 54, at 175 (describing 
the role of courts in diagnosing physical abnormalities in wrongful birth and wrongful death cases 
and noting that something similar occurs in all tort cases); see also Mackenzie, supra note 98, at 390 
(on the role of medical experts in normalizing bodily differences).  
103. This is the essence of “make-whole” relief in the context of personal injury law. See John 
C.P. Goldberg, supra note 69, at 435–36 (2006). 
104. Mackenzie, supra note 98, at 390. 
105. Hensel, supra note 54, at 185.  
106. See Brisenden, supra note 16, at 23 (discussing the “mythologized physical norm” and its 
“impossible demands”); Mackenzie, supra note 98, at 391. 
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litigation’s heavy reliance on medical experts reveals both its 
commitment to the medical model of disability and its vulnerability to 
blindsight with regard to the experiences of people with disabilities. 
B.  How Tort Litigation Suggests that Plaintiffs with Disabilities Are 
“Less than Whole” 
One of the fundamental goals of tort litigation is to return plaintiffs as 
closely as possible to the positions they were in before they were 
injured.107 In most instances, this is referred to as “making the plaintiff 
whole.”108 While “make-whole” relief is an element of remedies in other 
areas of the law,109 in tort litigation the repeated references to “making 
the plaintiff whole” take on a disturbing connotation. Because plaintiffs 
in tort litigation frequently seek compensation for bodily injuries, the 
references to “making the plaintiff whole” suggest that plaintiffs’ bodies 
are not “whole” without the relief. From a disability rights perspective, 
however, people with disabling injuries already are whole, even without 
medical intervention.110 When legal actors in tort litigation suggest 
otherwise, they reveal another way in which tort litigation’s commitment 
to a medical model of disability results in institutional blindsight. 
To understand why the references to “make-whole” relief in tort 
litigation are so problematic, it is helpful to consider how “make-whole” 
relief in tort litigation differs from “make-whole” relief in other areas of 
the law. One of the key differences is in the remedy’s focus. In other 
areas of the law, “making the plaintiff whole” usually entails forward-
looking relief.111 Under this approach, the goal of the remedy is not to 
put the plaintiffs in the same position they were in before the defendant 
acted; rather, the goal is to put plaintiffs in the position that they would 
have been in, but for the defendants’ conduct. In a contract case, for 
example, “making the plaintiff whole” means putting the plaintiffs in the 
                                                     
107. MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 710 
(9th ed. 2011). 
108. Goldberg, supra note 103, at 435 (“The point of tort damages is to compensate, to restore the 
status quo ante, to make the plaintiff whole. . . .”); see also FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW 
OF TORTS §25.1, at 490, 492 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that the role of tort compensation is to make the 
plaintiff as whole as possible with an award of money).  
109. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 15–16 (3d ed. 2002) (describing 
the notion of returning plaintiff to the position she “would have been in but for the wrong” as the 
“essence of compensatory damages”). 
110. Hunt, supra note 47, at 9 (“[E]ven the most severely disabled people retain an ineradicable 
conviction that they are still fully human in all that is ultimately necessary.”). 
111. Goldberg, supra note 69, at 436. 
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same position that they would have been in if the defendant had fulfilled 
the contract.112 While in some instances, a plaintiff may also receive 
backward-looking relief (such as reliance damages) in contract cases, in 
the usual case, the emphasis is on “making the plaintiff” whole in a way 
that looks forward. 113 
In tort litigation, however, “making the plaintiff whole” involves a 
different calculation. Instead of focusing on forward-looking relief, 
“make-whole” relief in tort litigation looks backward and seeks to 
restore the plaintiffs to the position they were in before the defendant 
engaged in wrongful conduct.114 The difference in analysis is important 
because, while the forward-looking approach tends to focus on the 
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct, the backward-looking 
approach of tort litigation focuses on plaintiffs’ “losses.”115 
In tort cases involving personal injuries, the emphasis on the 
plaintiffs’ losses that goes hand in hand with “make-whole” relief 
invariably leads to a focus on plaintiffs’ bodies. For example, in tort 
cases involving bodily injury, “make-whole” relief typically entails 
requiring defendants to pay the costs of the plaintiffs’ bodily “losses,” 
including the cost of any future medical treatments aimed at restoring 
the plaintiffs’ bodies to the condition they were in before the defendants’ 
actions. In some instances, this might mean allocating money for 
medical treatment or equipment.116 In others, it may involve paying for 
plaintiffs to receive personal assistance.117 The overall goal, however, is 
the same—to the extent possible, to restore plaintiffs’ bodies to the 
condition they were in before the injuries occurred. 
The problem with this approach is that, as it is currently practiced, 
“make-whole” relief in tort litigation embraces the medical model’s 
notion of conforming plaintiffs’ bodies to society, rather than the other 
way around.118 Rather than looking forward at what steps the defendant 
could take to ensure that plaintiffs will not suffer as a result of 
defendants’ conduct, tort litigation looks backward and treats plaintiffs’ 
injured bodies as the problem. The fact that damages seem to be 
calculated on the bases of what it would cost to “normalize” plaintiffs’ 
bodies makes this message even more powerful. 
                                                     
112. RICHARD L. HASEN, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS: REMEDIES 60 (2d ed. 2010). 
113. Id. at 100. 
114. Goldberg, supra note 69, at 436. 
115. Id. 
116. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 107, at 14.  
117. Id.  
118. Fordham, supra note 34, at 1517. 
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Importantly, assessments of plaintiffs’ likely medical costs are not the 
problem. Most plaintiffs with physical injuries will face these costs, and 
it is proper to include them in the overall damages calculation. It is 
problematic, however, to characterize these costs as necessary to “make 
the plaintiff whole.” A better approach would refer to the damages as 
“plaintiff’s anticipated medical costs as a result of the injury.” By 
focusing on plaintiffs’ future needs, this alternative approach to 
characterizing medical costs does not portray plaintiffs’ bodies relative 
to an idealized norm or even compare plaintiffs’ current bodies to the 
bodies they had before. Instead, the focus is forward-looking and, like 
“make-whole” relief in other areas of the law, speaks in terms of 
correcting the consequences of defendants’ wrongful conduct rather than 
attempting to erase plaintiffs’ “losses.”119 
It is also problematic to base the actual calculation of plaintiffs’ 
damages on a backward looking approach to “making the plaintiff 
whole.” For one thing, many people with disabilities do not want 
“normalized” bodies.120 Instead, they feel “whole” without medical 
intervention and do not want treatment to change their condition. The 
most frequently cited example is that of Deaf people who refuse 
cochlear implants.121 But Paul Miller, my co-author, also felt this way 
about his dwarfism. In an article on surgeries conducted with the 
purpose of “normalizing” children, he wrote about his childhood 
frustrations with adults who constantly asked him whether he wished he 
were taller.122 Like many people designated as “disabled,” he had no 
wish to change the part of himself that others equated with disability.123 
People who acquire a disability as a result of an accident or intentional 
wrongdoing may feel differently and welcome treatments aimed at 
changing a disabling condition but it is a mistake to assume they do. 
After suffering the initial injuries, some people may prefer not to 
undergo further bodily interference in the form of “normalizing” medical 
                                                     
119. One of the problems with tort litigation’s backward-looking approach is this equation of 
injury with “loss.” From a disability rights perspective, disabling injuries involve physical changes 
but not necessarily bodily “losses.” 
120. Mackenzie, supra note 98, at 391. In fact, some with bodies designated as “normal” seek 
bodily changes that would result in their bodies being re-designated as “abnormal.” Id. (discussing 
elective amputees). 
121. M. Grodin & H. Lane, Ethical Issues in Cochlear Implant Surgery: An Exploration into 
Disease, Disability and the Best Interests of the Child, 7 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J. 231 (1997). 
122. Paul Steven Miller, Toward Truly Informed Decisions about Appearance-Normalizing 
Surgeries, in SURGICALLY SHAPING CHILDREN: TECHNOLOGY, ETHICS, AND THE PURSUIT OF 
NORMALITY 211, 211 (Erik Parens ed., 2006).  
123. Id.  
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treatments. Others may feel more “whole” after an injury than they did 
before.124 For people in either of these two groups, calculating damages 
on the basis of a backward looking approach that seeks to “make the 
plaintiff whole” does not make sense because they may have no desire to 
return to the prior state. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that tort litigation’s emphasis on 
“making the plaintiff whole” obscures an important fact: while many 
people without disabilities are very afraid of becoming disabled, people 
with disabilities typically do not actually enjoy life less than their non-
disabled counterparts.125 This is true even for those who acquire a 
disability later in life as a result of an accident or an intentional 
wrongdoing.126 Contrary to popular belief, most accident victims adjust 
to their bodily differences fairly quickly and go on to live happy lives.127 
Donna Bailey is a good example. News reports on the litigation gave the 
impression that Bailey would be spending the rest of her life in a 
hospital bed, with little to no life beyond daily medical care.128 In fact, 
she is very active and describes her life in positive ways.129 
Tort litigation’s backward-looking approach to “making the plaintiff 
whole” ignores the experiences of Bailey and others with disabling 
injuries who often feel “whole” without medical treatment that restores 
them to their prior state. It also ignores the experience of people who 
may not wish to return to the state that they were in prior to their 
injuries. While most plaintiffs in tort litigation will seek compensation 
for future medical expenses, tort litigation should not require plaintiffs to 
characterize their lives, or their bodies, as “less than whole” in order to 
                                                     
124. GILBERT, supra note 23, at 165–88 (providing examples of people who describe themselves 
as “better off” after a serious injury). To give an extreme example, what if a defendant accidentally 
maims a person who has long been seeking to become an elective amputee? In such a case, the 
plaintiff may feel more “whole” as a result of the defendant’s conduct than she did before the 
accident. Yet under tort law’s “make the plaintiff whole” approach, the plaintiff would need to 
present herself disingenuously as “less than whole” as a condition for relief. See Bloom, supra note 
31, at 21 (discussing elective amputees). 
125. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 775. 
126. Indeed, it is notable that people with paralyzing injuries are particularly likely to return to 
high rates of happiness. Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1541. 
127. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 775; Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1541. 
128. See, e.g., Eyewitness News (KENS5 San Antonio broadcast Aug. 9, 2001) (showing images 
of Bailey in her hospital room) (on file with the author); Sara Nathan & Guillermo X. Garcia, 
Woman Settles with Ford, Firestone, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 2001 (showing a photograph of Bailey in 
her hospital bed). 
129. See Alejandro Bodipo-Memba, Ford Replacement Plan to End; Texas Woman Copes With 
Paralysis (Mar. 29, 2002), available at http://sci.rutgers.edu/forum/showthread.php?t=29306 
(describing Bailey as upbeat about her future and active with an outdoor counseling group for 
troubled youth).  
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obtain that relief. 
In sum, much like the heavy reliance on medical experts, tort 
litigation’s “make-whole” relief treats plaintiffs’ bodies, rather than 
defendants’ conduct, as the “problem to be solved.”130 In both instances, 
the “system” that makes this possible is the medical model of disability, 
which considers the body the best indicator of injury and views bodily 
impairments as tragedies. From the disability rights perspective, 
however, this use of the medical model in tort litigation results in 
institutional blindsight; portraying people with disabilities as less than 
whole makes it difficult to recognize that they can lead happy and 
fulfilling lives. 
II.  WHAT HAPPENS IN COURTS DOES NOT STAY IN COURTS: 
TORT LITIGATION’S INFLUENCE ON PERCEPTIONS OF 
DISABILITY 
Legal narratives play an important role in shaping public perceptions 
and behavior.131 The perceptions of lawyers, judges, and other legal 
actors are especially vulnerable to the persuasive power of legal 
discourse, but the narratives used in court cases also influence people 
with no apparent interest in the litigation.132 Thus, when legal actors 
portray people with disabilities in distorted ways, the effects are not 
limited to the litigation. 
This Part considers tort litigation’s role in fostering a distorted view 
of disability in the broader culture. It examines the messages tort 
                                                     
130. The reference is to the quote with which this Part began: “What kind of system bids us each 
make of our bodies a problem to be solved, a claim we must defend, or a secret we must publicly 
confess, again and again?” Wilchins, supra note 30, at 550 (paraphrasing Foucault). 
131. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
AMONG WORKING CLASS AMERICANS 9 (1990) (discussing how law shapes what we think about 
the world); see also MURRAY EDELMAN, POLITICS AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: MASS AROUSAL AND 
QUIESCENCE 101 (1971) (noting that governmental actors are “powerful shapers of perceptions”); 
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE 135 (1974) (citing EDELMAN, supra, and making a similar point in the context of courts); 
see generally MARC GALANTER, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUT 
COURTS 117, 118 (Keith Boyum & Lynn Mather eds., 1983) (describing the outward “flow of 
influence” from the courts);  
132. See, e.g., WILLIAM FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR 
MOVEMENT 135 (1991) (arguing that legal rulings deeply affected the ideology and strategies of the 
American labor movement); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND 
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 58 (1994) (describing how legal rulings inform political 
activists); Sherilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public 
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 444–45 (2000) (noting that judges may be even more 
susceptible than jurors to narratives and stereotypes). 
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litigation conveys about disability and explains how these messages can 
shape cultural attitudes about people with disabilities. It also considers 
how contemporary tort practices—such as the reliance on expert medical 
testimony and the emphasis on “make-whole” relief—may affect 
plaintiffs’ views of themselves. In both instances, I express concern 
about how tort litigation provides legitimacy for harmful stereotypes 
about disabilities outside the courthouse doors. 
A. Tort Litigation’s Blindsight Shapes Public Perceptions 
When Donna Bailey sued Ford and Firestone, her attorney allowed 
the media to take videos and photographs of her in the hospital, which 
were then featured in news stories about the case.133 These images—
which may still be viewed on the internet—emphasize Bailey’s physical 
limitations.134 She is shown lying in a bed in a position of complete 
dependency.135 Like many people with severe injuries, however, Bailey 
adjusted to her impairments in a relatively short period of time.136 While 
she went through a “long period of grieving and depression,” she also 
reported that she felt “joy” and “very fortunate” less than two years after 
the accident.137 The extent to which Bailey adjusted to her injuries, 
however, received very little news coverage.138 
This distorted coverage is not unique.139 The media routinely report 
on tort litigation—and plaintiffs in particular—in ways that distort both 
plaintiffs’ injuries and legal outcomes.140 In some instances, distortion 
                                                     
133. See, e.g., Sara Nathan & Guillermo X. Garcia, Woman Settles with Ford, Firestone, USA 
TODAY, Jan. 9, 2001 (showing a photograph of Bailey in her hospital bed); see also Eyewitness 
News, supra note 128 (showing images of Bailey in her hospital room). 
134. See e.g., Eyewitness News, supra note 128. 
135. Id.  
136. Bodipo-Memba, supra note 129; see also Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1526–31 
(summarizing the literature on adjustment and adaptation); Peter A. Ubel et al., Mismanaging the 
Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and Health Care Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 
S57, S58 (2005) (describing how most people with disabilities and chronic illness adjust to their 
conditions and go on to lead happy lives).  
137. Bodipo-Memba, supra note 129.  
138. Only one article appears to have followed up on what happened to Donna Bailey after the 
litigation. See id. One reporter, however, wrote a best-selling book on the litigation, which was 
published well after the litigation ended. See PENENBERG, supra note 76.The book’s title—Tragic 
Indifference—suggests the overall theme. 
139. For an overview of the problem, see WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING 
THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004). 
140. See id. at 20 (identifying the various institutional constraints, including the “sheer length, 
complexity, and uncertainty of legal proceedings,” that compromise the quality of the media 
coverage). 
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occurs despite the attorneys’ best efforts to generate more accurate 
portrayals of the facts in the litigation.141 In tort cases involving 
plaintiffs with disabilities, however, the biased ways in which courts, 
lawyers, and experts portray plaintiffs’ injuries exacerbate the distortion. 
Cases involving wrongful birth and wrongful life claims illustrate this 
point very clearly. In Gleitman v. Cosgrove,142 the first case to address 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, the plaintiff alleged that the 
injury was “be[ing] born to suffer with an impaired body.”143 Although 
the court ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s claims as “impossible” to 
decide,144 the court’s reasoning relied upon a view that children born 
with disabilities brought fewer benefits to their parents than children 
born without disabilities.145 Subsequent cases have followed a similar 
path.146 While courts hearing these cases are not always explicit in their 
reasoning, the inescapable message of Cosgrove and its progeny is that 
disability is undesirable.147 
Legal rulings and arguments in cases involving hedonic damages send 
similar messages.148 Courts in these cases frequently equate the 
experience of disability with the “lost enjoyment of life.”149 The message 
this sends is troubling enough but plaintiffs’ lawyers and judges also 
send harmful messages in their presentations to the jury and legal 
rulings.150 Some lawyers, for example, suggest that the lives of plaintiffs 
with disabilities lack dignity.151 And courts commonly use language that 
suggests that plaintiffs with disabilities are unable to participate in their 
own lives.152 Like the judicial discourse in wrongful life and birth cases, 
                                                     
141. See, e.g., Michael McCann, William Haltom & Anne Bloom, Java Jive: Genealogy of a 
Juridical Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113, 159–67, 172 (2001) (describing the persistence of a 
distorted media portrayal of the McDonald’s coffee case, despite the efforts of the plaintiff’s 
attorney to correct the distortion). 
142. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). 
143. Id. at 692. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 692–93; see also Hensel, supra note 54, at 154–62 (discussing how courts tend to 
ignore the benefits of having children with disabilities in wrongful birth claims).  
146. Hensel, supra note 54, at 154–62. 
147. Id.; see also NICOLLETE PRIAULX, THE HARM PARADOX: TORT LAW AND THE UNWANTED 
CHILD IN AN ERA OF CHOICE 54 (Sheila McLean ed., 2007).  
148. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 752–60 (providing examples of the 
stigmatizing portrayal of disabilities by judges and lawyers in cases involving hedonic damages). 
149. Id. at 778. 
150. See id. at 753 (providing examples of how plaintiffs’ attorneys present hedonic damage 
claims); see also id. at 755–56 (providing examples of how courts present the claims).  
151. Id. at 752–53. 
152. See, e.g., id. at 755–56.  
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these messages amount to a “community pronouncement, via a 
government institution,” that the lives of people with disabilities are 
inherently tragic.153 
Tort litigation’s heavy reliance on medical experts—and the emphasis 
on “make-whole” relief—also operate in ways that generate troubling 
messages about disability. Donna Bailey’s lawyers, for example, 
planned to use medical experts to create a picture of dependence and 
tragedy.154 And lawyers commonly interpret “make-whole” relief in 
ways that suggest that the bodies of people with disabilities are “less 
than whole.” Trial manuals, for example, encourage plaintiffs’ lawyers 
to make references to the plaintiff’s “broken body” as a metaphor for the 
plaintiff’s entire life.155 Thus, these practices, too, send a message that 
life with a disability is inherently undesirable. 
These distorted portrayals reinforce legal actors’ own biases about 
people with disabilities but, much more broadly, they shape public 
perceptions by placing the court’s imprimatur on the messages 
involved.156 When the media transmits these messages to the general 
public, the influence on perceptions is likely to be particularly 
powerful.157 Not only do the messages get repeated over and over again, 
they also reach many more people. When this happens, the distorted 
messages about disability that are produced in tort litigation can 
encourage people who have no connection to the litigation to view 
disability in biased ways. Thus, when lawyers and courts present 
plaintiffs with disabilities as “tragedies,” they reproduce cultural 
stereotypes with far-reaching effects. 
B.  Tort Litigation Encourages Plaintiffs to View Themselves in 
Harmful Ways 
Presenting tort plaintiffs with disabilities as tragedies also poses risks 
to plaintiffs’ psychological well-being. Although many people with 
disabilities perceive that “[l]ife with a disability is no more often a 
                                                     
153. Hensel, supra note 54, at 173. 
154. See discussion supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
155. See, e.g., SHEA, supra note 88, at 15–17 (recommending comparing the plaintiff’s life to that 
of a “prisoner”). 
156. Sagit Mor makes a similar argument in a forthcoming work on disability and torts. See Mor, 
supra note 14 (discussing tort litigation’s role in generating stigmatizing assumptions).  
157. See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 139, at 177 (explaining how media coverage “seeps 
into readers’ consciousness subtly and steadily”). There is perhaps no better example of this than the 
McDonald’s coffee case, which entered the cultural consciousness in an extraordinary way and 
convinced many Americans of the need for tort reform. See McCann et al., supra note 141.  
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tragedy than is life without a disability,”158 they sometimes internalize 
social prejudices about disabilities.159 Unfortunately, repeatedly 
portraying plaintiffs with disabilities in negative ways may make it more 
likely that internalization of social prejudices will occur.160 Current 
practices in wrongful birth and life actions, for example, send a message 
to people with disabilities that their impairments are so severe that a 
reasonable person would not want to live with them (or give birth to a 
child with similar impairments).161 Arguments in the context of liability 
for genetic intervention send a similar message,162 as do the 
presentations of claims for hedonic damages.163 In each of these 
instances, tort litigation asks plaintiffs to “denigrate” themselves as a 
condition for recovery.164 
The over-reliance on medical experts and the repeated references to 
“making the plaintiff whole” in tort litigation have similar effects. The 
heavy reliance on medical testimony, for example, sends a message to 
plaintiffs that the experience of disability is primarily a medical one. 
Likewise, the repeated references to “making the plaintiff whole” 
suggest that the plaintiff is currently less than “whole.” In both respects, 
tort litigation encourages plaintiffs to adopt an understanding of their 
injuries that is at odds with most people’s actual experiences with 
disabling injuries. 
For people who acquire a disability later in life—perhaps through an 
accident that gives rise to tort litigation—the risk of internalizing these 
messages may be especially great. As we saw with the case of Donna 
Bailey, most people with serious injuries experience an adjustment 
period.165 While the initial trauma is significant, most people with severe 
injuries return to their pre-injury states of happiness within a relatively 
short period of time.166 During this time of adjustment, judges, lawyers, 
                                                     
158. Miller, supra note 122, at 221. 
159. Hensel, supra note 54, at 174. 
160. As Bagenstos and Schlanger note, “if nothing else, the drive to avoid cognitive dissonance” 
may lead plaintiffs to come to believe their own testimony. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, 
at 785; see also Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client Identity in Disability Rights 
Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 253 (2001) (making a similar argument in the civil rights 
context).  
161. Hensel, supra note 54, at 172 n.173. 
162. Fordham, supra note 34, at 1525–26; see also Ouellette, supra note 35, at 400.  
163. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 785. 
164. Hensel, supra note 54, at 172 n.171. 
165. Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1526–31 (summarizing the literature on adjustment for 
people who become disabled). 
166. Id. 
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and other legal actors play a particularly important role in shaping how 
plaintiffs perceive their injuries.167 When experts and lawyers repeatedly 
present a plaintiff as tragic, they may help the plaintiff to construct an 
understanding of her condition that may be more negative—and more 
permanent—than it would be otherwise.168 Worse, plaintiffs repeatedly 
exposed to the view that the lives of people with disabilities are 
inherently “tragic” may internalize this view and never make the 
adjustment.169 
For similar reasons, putting plaintiffs through a process in which they 
must repeatedly present themselves as “tragic” and “less than whole” is 
also a form of disempowerment. Messages like these encourage others to 
view plaintiffs with pity.170 Pity, however, is not a sentiment generally 
associated with respect or power.171 In some instances, an injured 
person’s desire to avoid this disempowerment may prevent them from 
bringing otherwise worthy claims. Currently, tort litigation demands a 
kind of public humiliation as the price of entry (or at least a willingness 
to identify publicly as someone who is less than whole). Because some 
people may not view themselves as less than whole in the ways that the 
tort system demands, they may be reluctant to bring claims that require 
them to describe themselves in this way. 
In sum, when tort litigation repeatedly presents plaintiffs with 
disabilities as “tragedies” and “less than whole,” at least two things 
                                                     
167. See Rovner, supra note 160, at 312–13 (making a similar argument in the context of civil 
rights claims); see also Ellen S. Pryor, Noneconomic Damages, Suffering, and the Role of the 
Plaintiff’s Lawyer, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 565 (2006) (arguing that plaintiff’s lawyers influence 
their client’s experience of suffering). 
168. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 785 (“[B]y focusing on the negative feelings that 
occur during [the period of injury], plaintiffs with disabilities may delay or derail their ultimate 
ability to adapt to their new condition . . . .”); Bronsteen et al., supra note 26, at 1537 (arguing that 
litigation may cause plaintiffs to overestimate the extent of their injuries); see also EDWARD B. 
BLANCHARD & EDWARD J. HICKLING, AFTER THE CRASH: ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF 
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT SURVIVORS 171–86 (1997) (summarizing research on whether tort 
litigation prolongs or exacerbates suffering). 
169. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1545 (making similar arguments in the context of a 
trial). Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur argue for delaying tort claims to allow 
plaintiffs time to adjust. Id. at 1548–49. Because there are numerous drawbacks associated with 
delaying tort litigation (including the risk of losing key evidence) and because the plaintiffs will still 
be exposed to the harmful messages at a later date, I believe it makes more sense to incorporate 
procedures that will minimize exposure to harmful stereotypes and facilitate plaintiffs’ adjustment 
without delaying their day in court. See discussion infra notes 231–241 and accompanying text; see 
also Ronen Perry, Empowerment and Tort Law, 76 TENN. L. REV. 959, 986–87 (2009) (describing 
the psychological risks posed to the plaintiff by delaying trial). 
170. Rovner, supra note 160, at 289. 
171. Id. at 291. 
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happen. First, it presents a distorted view of disability to the public at 
large.172 Second, the narrative becomes a part of the plaintiff’s own self-
understanding.173 In both respects, the way in which tort litigation 
currently portrays injured plaintiffs is a form of interpretive violence that 
can cause real psychological and social harm.174 
III.  HOW TO APPROACH DISABILITIES DIFFERENTLY 
(WITHOUT SACRIFICING PLAINTIFFS’ RECOVERIES) 
This Part suggests two ways that legal actors in tort litigation can 
begin to confront their blindsight and make tort litigation a more 
empowering space for people with injuries that are identified as 
disabling. The first proposed change is for legal actors to encourage 
plaintiffs and third parties with similar injuries to become more active 
participants in tort litigation and to speak freely about the complexity of 
their experiences. The second proposed change requires legal actors to 
talk differently about plaintiffs with disabilities. Instead of emphasizing 
that plaintiffs are “less than whole,” legal actors in tort litigation should 
seek to present plaintiffs in ways that acknowledge the seriousness of 
plaintiffs’ injuries without making plaintiffs objects of pity. Because 
some people may believe that it is impossible to make these changes 
without significantly reducing plaintiffs’ recoveries, this Part also 
suggests alternative ways of presenting plaintiff’s injuries that are 
consistent with recovering significant damages. Although it is 
impossible to predict the impact on recoveries, I argue that directing 
jurors’ attention to other issues—such as defendants’ wrongful conduct 
and interference with plaintiffs’ liberty—could result in comparable and 
perhaps even higher verdicts. 
                                                     
172. My arguments here were influenced by Anthony Alfieri’s important critique of the practices 
of poverty lawyers. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: 
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).  
173. As Karl Llewellyn noted long ago, “[C]ategories and concepts, once formulated and once 
they have entered into thought processes, tend to take on an appearance of solidity, reality and 
inherent value which has no foundation in experience.” Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic 
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453 (1930); see also Devon Carbado & 
Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1288–89 (2000) (describing how identity 
performances can transform the performer’s sense of self). 
174. See Alfieri, supra note 172, at 2125–26 (describing the role of interpretive violence in 
poverty law practice); see also Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601–
05 (1986) (arguing that legal interpretations are a form of social violence because as legal actors 
embrace one normative world, they destroy another).  
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A. Making Room for People with Disabilities to Become More Active 
Participants in the Litigation 
Legal actors in tort litigation sit in a relatively unique position in 
relation to disability. Injured plaintiffs who bring tort claims are often in 
transition, as they adjust to a new understanding of themselves that may 
include identifying, for the first time, as persons with disabilities. As a 
result, tort litigation provides a unique opportunity to engage directly 
with people as they go through the experience of becoming disabled. 
Legal actors in tort litigation should take advantage of this opportunity. 
Not only will engaging more actively with plaintiffs help us to better 
understand the extent to which blindsight distorts current practices, 
greater engagement with plaintiffs is also likely to yield more just 
results. 
Legal actors in tort litigation do not perceive disabilities accurately 
because most of them do not have personal experience with 
disabilities.175 Just as experts’ opinions are tainted by a “normality bias,” 
lawyers, judges, witnesses, jurors, news reporters, and the general public 
also approach litigation from the viewpoint of their prior cognitive 
experiences.176 These prior experiences shape how legal actors frame the 
issues and how the general public interprets the messages that the 
litigation transmits.177 In most instances, however, the prior cognitive 
experiences on both sides of the communication do not include a 
personal experience with disability. As a result, the risk of blindsight is 
quite high. 
The role that limited cognitive experience plays in creating blindsight, 
however, also suggests the appropriate response. Legal actors in tort 
litigation can minimize the effects of blindsight by learning more about 
how people with disabilities perceive their lives. While people without 
disabilities may never fully understand the experience of living with a 
disability, they can increase their cognitive understanding by interacting 
with people who do have that personal experience.178 Thus, for legal 
                                                     
175. See discussion supra Part I. 
176. See Hensel, supra note 54, at 185–86 (describing the biases of legal actors about disability); 
discussion supra notes 93–106 and accompanying text (describing the cognitive biases of experts). 
See generally David Engel, Lumping as Default in Tort Cases: The Cultural Interpretation of 
Injury, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 35, 52–54 (2011) (describing how cultural understandings of injury 
influence the perceptions of both legal and non-legal actors).  
177. Engel, supra note 176, at 52–54, 64–65 (describing the role of perceptions in influencing, 
and being influenced by, legal discourse).  
178. Some may also gain greater cognitive experience through their own personal experience 
with disability. For most of us, living without disability is a temporary state.  
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actors in tort litigation to overcome their blindsight, it is crucial to 
change the litigation in ways that will allow this engagement to occur. 
Currently, tort practices provide few opportunities for people with 
disabilities to participate in the litigation in meaningful ways. Part of the 
problem is that plaintiffs with disabling injuries typically play a 
remarkably limited role in their own lawsuits.179 One reason why they 
play such a limited role is that plaintiffs’ lawyers seeking to portray their 
clients as “tragic” sometimes discourage their clients from appearing in 
the courtroom or taking the stand for very long—especially if the 
plaintiffs appear too happy or otherwise well-adjusted.180 Even when this 
is not the case, however, the heavy emphasis on expert testimony in tort 
cases effectively marginalizes the plaintiff’s voice. 
These practices need to change. Plaintiffs should be encouraged to 
participate more in their own litigation.181 The reasons for this are both 
individual and institutional. For many plaintiffs, greater participation 
will provide an important remedy for the wrong that has been done to 
them.182 Equally important, greater participation from plaintiffs is likely 
to yield a more complex perspective on disability than we are currently 
hearing in most tort cases. In both respects, encouraging greater 
participation from plaintiffs in tort litigation is likely to improve the 
proceedings’ overall fairness. 
At the same time, legal actors in tort litigation also need to encourage 
more involvement from third parties with disabilities. While in most 
instances, plaintiffs will provide the best testimony about their own 
experience with the injuries, third parties with similar injuries and 
disabilities are likely to provide more accurate information about how 
the plaintiffs will experience their injuries in the future.183 This is 
because, in most instances, third parties with similar injuries will have 
already gone through the period of adjustment that typically 
accompanies the experience of becoming disabled. Thus, if we want to 
gain a better understanding of how the plaintiff is likely to experience a 
                                                     
179. See Rovner, supra note 160, at 312–13. 
180. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 754–55. 
181. Rovner, supra note 160, at 312–13. 
182. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 973-74, 1051 
(1991) (emphasizing the importance of having our stories heard); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural 
Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 103, 105 (1988) (presenting evidence that involvement in the decision-making process 
enhances the participants’ perception of fairness).  
183. See GILBERT, supra note 23, at 114–16 (explaining how people with previous experience 
with an injury typically provide the best information about the likely future to others with similar 
injuries).  
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disabling injury in the future, it is essential for tort litigation to solicit 
testimony from third parties who have personal experience with a 
condition that is the same or similar to that of the plaintiffs.184 
Testimony from third parties with disabilities would also yield a host 
of other benefits. First, testimony from third parties would likely provide 
a check against faking because the plaintiff’s testimony would be heard 
in a broader context that includes testimony from others with similar 
injuries. Second, as compared to other sources of testimony, third parties 
with direct experience with disabilities are more likely to provide the 
fact-finder with important information about the social experience of 
living with a disability. This would help all legal actors to understand 
disability in more complex ways and would provide important balance 
for the view of disability that medical experts currently present. 
Including third party testimony from witnesses with direct experience 
with disabilities would also be valuable to plaintiffs. Psychological 
studies confirm the value of hearing from others who have undergone 
similar experiences.185 Among other benefits, experiential experts can 
help plaintiffs understand disabilities in more complex ways. For 
example, as compared to legal actors and others with whom the plaintiff 
is interacting, third party experiential experts are more likely to 
acknowledge that disability “need not be a disadvantaged or permanent 
state.”186 Ultimately, including these experiential experts could help 
plaintiffs with disabling injuries adjust to their changed circumstances 
with significantly less emotional trauma. In short, instead of encouraging 
plaintiffs to view themselves as tragedies, legal actors in tort litigation 
could employ practices that are likely to play a more therapeutic role in 
the plaintiffs’ lives.187 
My co-author, Paul Miller, described an example of how people with 
disabilities benefit from hearing from others with similar conditions in 
an article he wrote on the impact of assisted suicide on persons with 
disabilities.188 It involved the case of Larry McAfee, who became 
disabled when he broke his neck in a motorcycle accident.189 McAfee 
                                                     
184. See, e.g., Bronsteen et al., supra note 25, at 1545 (describing the period of adjustment)..  
185. GILBERT, supra note 23, at 251. 
186. Mackenzie, supra note 98, at 397.  
187. On the potentially therapeutic role of law, see generally BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1977).  
188. Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with Disabilities—Is It a 
Right Without Freedom?, 9 ISSUES L. MED. 47, 58 (1993) (discussing State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 
651 (Ga. 1989)). 
189. Id. 
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initially petitioned a court for the right to commit suicide by having his 
ventilator removed.190 In response, several disability organizations 
contacted McAfee and offered to help him live independently and 
without stigma.191 These contacts changed McAfee’s perspective. He 
withdrew the petition and chose to live.192 
McAfee’s story suggests the importance of greater participation from 
people with disabilities in tort litigation, especially for plaintiffs with 
severe injuries. The current practice of privileging medical testimony 
over other forms of evidence makes the medical aspects of disability 
seem more important than they really are, and wrongly encourages all of 
tort litigation’s participants—including the plaintiffs—to believe that 
disability is primarily a medical problem. Introducing third party 
experiential testimony about disabilities could change this dynamic in 
positive ways. 
Importantly, nothing stands in the way of permitting testimony from 
third parties with similar injuries, except lawyers’ and judges’ 
blindsight. Judges typically grant lawyers wide latitude in presenting 
their cases.193 The main restriction on the presentation of evidence is 
relevance.194 This should not be an issue with third party experiential 
testimony, however, because the testimony is plainly relevant to the 
question of future injury. Thus, it would be difficult to exclude third 
party testimony on this ground. Moreover, to the extent that third parties 
with disabilities speak to issues beyond the scope of their personal 
experience, the witnesses could be qualified as experts and subjected to 
the usual rules governing the admission of expert testimony.195 




193. See, e.g., THOMAS A. MOORE, EVIDENCE IN NEGLIGENCE CASES, at 3-27 to 3-29 (10th ed. 
2010) (noting that trial courts should give attorneys wide latitude in the selection and presentation of 
testimony from witnesses). 
194. See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 111 F.3d. 197, 202 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1988); see also FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevance as 
“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”).  
195. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993). The use 
of third party experiential experts is also not unprecedented. In civil rights cases, third party 
experiential testimony has been used to help the court understand how individuals experience 
differential treatment. For example, in the recent California case on the constitutionality of a local 
proposition prohibiting gay marriage, the court heard third party experiential testimony on the 
experience of being gay. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 938–40 (N.D. Cal. 
2010) (describing the testimony of lay witnesses in the case, including testimony from non-parties 
on their experiences with discrimination). This testimony was offered in addition to testimony from 
expert witnesses, so as to provide the court with more information about the effects of the 
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Nevertheless, some lawyers and judges may object to the testimony of 
third parties with direct experience with disabilities on the ground of 
prejudice.196 Objections on the basis of prejudice, however, should not 
succeed. Testimony from people with direct experience with disabilities 
is no more prejudicial, and perhaps less prejudicial, than that of experts 
without disabilities. While lawyers on both sides may be concerned 
about how the testimony of third parties may influence a fact-finder’s 
view of the case,197 this is exactly the point of offering the testimony—to 
influence how all actors in the litigation perceive the experience and to 
encourage them to understand disability in more complex ways. From 
this perspective, the testimony of third parties should be seen as helpful 
to the fact-finder for purposes of countering prejudices against people 
with disabilities that already taint the case. For all of these reasons, a 
court should conclude that the value of third-party testimony outweighs 
any potential prejudicial effect.198 
Thus, we can encourage greater participation in tort litigation from 
people with disabilities immediately. Nothing stands in our way besides 
our own unwillingness to change. The benefits of greater engagement, 
on the other hand, are potentially tremendous. As plaintiffs and others 
with disabling injuries begin to play a more active role in tort litigation, 
it is likely that legal actors in tort litigation will develop a more complex 
understanding of disability and portray people with disabilities in less 
distorted ways. 
B.  Changing the Way We Talk 
Engaging more with people who have direct experience with 
disabilities is an important step in the direction of confronting tort 
litigation’s blindsight about disabilities. The next steps are necessarily 
more tentative. As we learn more about the experience of people with 
disabilities in tort litigation, we will want to make changes that 
incorporate those insights. It is impossible to know exactly what those 
                                                     
proposition on their lives. Id. at 932–38.  
196. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing for the exclusion of evidence that poses a danger of unfair 
prejudice). 
197. See Peter Nicolas, “They Say He’s Gay”: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual 
Orientation, 37 GA. L. REV. 793, 798 (2003) (noting that all evidence is usually, at some level, 
“prejudicial” to the party against whom it is admitted). 
198. Under the rules of evidence, courts typically weigh the benefits of the evidence against any 
potential prejudice in deciding whether the evidence should be admitted. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & 
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.02[1][a] (Joseph M. McLaughlin 
ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
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changes will be until we actually begin the process of listening and 
learning. That process will take time but, in the meantime, we can show 
greater respect for people with disabilities by changing the way we talk. 
Current practices portray people with disabilities in offensive ways. In 
many instances, the practices portray plaintiffs with disabling injuries as 
“tragic” and “less than whole.”199 At other times, tort litigation suggests 
that the lives of people with disabilities are not worth living.200 A better 
approach would permit plaintiffs to recover without sacrificing their 
ability to identify as “whole” persons, and without denying the joy and 
happiness that people with disabilities experience in their lives. As a 
practical matter, this means moving away from our current narratives in 
tort litigation and adopting new ones. 
What other ways might lawyers structure the narratives of tort claims 
involving seriously injured plaintiffs? One possible alternative is a more 
rights-based narrative.201 In cases involving personal injuries, American 
culture tends to emphasize self-sufficiency over the assertion of legal 
rights.202 Because of this emphasis on self-sufficiency, many people do 
not pursue tort claims unless their injuries are so serious that they are 
unable to take care of themselves on their own.203 Moreover, once 
people decide to pursue claims, the tort system encourages plaintiffs to 
emphasize this lack of self-sufficiency by presenting themselves as “less 
than whole.”204 A rights-based narrative, in contrast, would not make the 
same cultural demands on plaintiffs and would allow for recovery 
without placing undue attention on the plaintiffs’ ability to care for 
themselves. 
A rights-based narrative, for example, might emphasize the right to be 
free from unwanted bodily interference. Such an approach recognizes 
that, while people may adapt to changes in their physical condition, they 
resent changes imposed on them without their consent.205 Moreover, a 
                                                     
199. See discussion supra notes 53–58, 107–110 and accompanying text.  
200. See discussion supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
201. See Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the 
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (2005) (making an argument for 
better linkages between tort law and rights claims, in the context of race and gender). 
202. See David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an 
American Community, in LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS 27, 33, 50 (Carol J. 
Greenhouse et al. eds., 1994) (describing findings that Americans tend to emphasize self-sufficiency 
over rights in personal injury litigation).  
203. See generally id. at 33.  
204. See discussion supra notes 158–164 and accompanying text (describing the narrative 
demands that tort litigation makes on injured plaintiffs). 
205. Fordham, supra note 34, at 1494 n.129. 
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narrative that focuses on plaintiffs’ right to be free from unwanted 
bodily interference also takes the emphasis off the perceived limitations 
of plaintiffs’ bodies and focuses instead on defendants’ wrongful 
conduct, including the defendants’ interference with the plaintiffs’ 
liberty. 
To understand how changing the legal narrative would play out in 
practice, consider this excerpt from an opinion in a tort case involving a 
seriously injured plaintiff: 
In this situation, Eric will never be able to do most of the normal 
things of life: the first date, parenting children, reading, debating 
the politics of the day, etc. Eric can see but not substantially 
comprehend, and he can hear but not substantially understand. 
There may be love and affection in his life, but almost all of the 
developments to which a normal person is exposed during his or 
her childhood and adulthood will pass him by.206 
While well-intended, the court’s opinion embraces many of the 
medical model’s themes of disability. It presents the plaintiff’s future 
life as a tragedy, while overlooking other important stories about the 
plaintiff’s experience. Of particular interest is the court’s focus on the 
plaintiff’s impairments. Repeatedly, the court mentions the activities that 
the plaintiff can no longer perform. But the opinion is also troubling 
because it attempts to predict a particular future for the plaintiff that may 
or may not correspond with what the plaintiff will actually experience. 
While it may be true that discriminatory attitudes and practices currently 
make engaging in these activities unlikely (or at least more difficult) for 
the plaintiff, for the court to rigidly incorporate these attitudes into its 
assessment of the plaintiff’s future seems terribly unfair and 
unnecessarily limiting. 
An alternative framing of the case might recognize the seriousness of 
the plaintiff’s injuries while still presenting the plaintiff in an 
empowering way. For example, the excerpt might be re-written as 
follows: 
In this situation, the defendant’s unwanted and wrongful 
interference with Eric’s autonomy has forced Eric to make 
substantial changes in his life without his consent. It is likely 
that defendant’s conduct will also cause Eric to experience 
significant constraints on his liberty in the future. For example, 
because of defendant’s conduct, it is likely that Eric will not be 
able to engage in common activities like the first date, parenting 
                                                     
206. Nemmers v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 567, 575 (C.D. Ill. 1988) (emphasis in original). 
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children, reading, and debating the politics of the day, without 
encountering social prejudice and structural barriers. We 
cannot fully understand what this might be like for Eric, either 
now or in the future. Nonetheless, we can recognize that the 
defendant’s conduct has wrongfully interfered with his rights 
and we can compensate him for that interference (changes in 
italics). 
In this new framing of the case, the emphasis is not on the plaintiff’s 
loss of physical capacity but on the defendant’s wrongful conduct in 
violating the plaintiff’s right to live without unwanted bodily 
interference. As re-written, the opinion also emphasizes the plaintiff’s 
right to liberty and connects the plaintiff’s disabilities to social prejudice 
and structural barriers. Finally, the re-written opinion does not deny the 
plaintiff’s capacity to engage in pleasurable activities. 
Reframing disability tort actions in this way is not as radical as it 
might seem. Rights-based narratives—which focus on ensuring 
accountability for the defendant’s wrongful interference with the 
plaintiff’s rights—are more consistent with the historic goals of tort law 
than the current emphasis on “making the plaintiff whole.”207 Properly 
understood, arguments for “make-whole” relief belong outside the 
purview of substantive tort law.208 Tort law’s principal aim is to provide 
a mechanism for “accountability.”209 The “less-than-whole” theme that 
dominates contemporary tort narratives distracts from this fundamental 
role by focusing more on the remedy than the wrong that gave rise to the 
case. 
Perhaps the most important implication of the proposed alternative 
framing, however, is the emphasis on plaintiff empowerment and 
equality.210 Instead of asking “to be made whole,” plaintiffs employing 
rights-based narratives demand respect and accountability as equals.211 
                                                     
207. See Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 
1775–79 (2009) (summarizing scholarship supporting the view that a notion of accountability is 
more consistent with the structure of tort law than “make-whole” relief); Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Rights, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L. J. 695, 697–98 (2003) [hereinafter 
Zipursky, Civil Recourse] (suggesting that rights-based models are more consistent with the 
structure of tort law than corrective justice or “make-whole” models). 
208. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 207, at 697–98. Thus, a court might consider “make-
whole” relief in the form of a remedy but it would follow the court’s recognizing the legal wrong 
and not be incorporated into the narratives accompanying the substantive tort claim. Id. at 697–98. 
209. See John Solomon, supra note 207, at 1775; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Wrongs and Recourse in 
the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Wrongs and Recourse]. 
210. Solomon, supra note 207, at 1796. 
211. Id. at 1778, 1796, 1807. 
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The point of the lawsuits is not to seek pity but for plaintiffs to have an 
opportunity to say directly to the defendants: “I know what you did, and 
you can’t do this to me.”212 If tort litigation is to overcome its blindsight 
toward people with disabilities, we need to move in this direction.213 
C.  What About the Money? 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers may be understandably concerned that departing 
from the current narratives in tort litigation will lead to seriously reduced 
recoveries. Under the conventional wisdom, “the more that a plaintiff 
looks like [a] victim, the more likely it is that she will be awarded 
damages.”214 If this belief is correct, plaintiffs’ lawyers are unlikely to 
refrain from presenting plaintiffs as tragedies because they may believe 
that doing so will prevent them from obtaining big recoveries.215 
Changing tort litigation’s narrative from pity to rights and 
accountability, however, will not necessarily have a negative impact on 
the overall award. Trial magazine—the leading practice magazine for 
the plaintiff’s bar—reports that juries award greater damages in response 
to outrage than they award for pity.216 If the magazine is correct, shifting 
away from pity will not result in a lower verdict, provided the lawyer 
reframes the litigation with a theme that is likely to trigger outrage, such 
as the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct or the unwanted 
interference with the plaintiff’s liberty.217 
It is also not necessary to present plaintiffs as tragedies to recover the 
medical costs associated with the injury, including any future medical 
expenses. In most personal injury cases, these costs properly constitute a 
large part of the recovery.218 Under an alternative narrative—including 
narratives that present plaintiffs in more empowering ways—plaintiffs 
would continue to obtain compensation for these medical costs and 
                                                     
212. Id. at 1797; see also Perry, supra note 169, at 966 (noting the role of tort litigation in 
conveying a “clear message of social dissatisfaction”). 
213. See, e.g., Fordham, supra note 34, at 1503 (noting that the disability rights community 
values self determination and community over self sufficiency and independence). 
214. Rovner, supra note 160, at 292; see also Perry, supra note 169, at 984 (describing how 
attorneys strategically victimize their clients). 
215. Rovner, supra note 160, at 287. 
216. O’Brien & Funk, supra note 29, at 20.  
217. This would also seemingly be an easy transition to make because many trial lawyers already 
rely on themes of accountability in their cases. SHEA, supra note 88, at 17 (suggesting numerous 
“accountability themes,” including “[t]his is a case about fairness” and “[h]e who does not open his 
eyes must open his purse.”). 
218. Swedloff & Huang, supra note 60, at 577–78 (describing the difference between economic 
losses, including medical costs, and non-economic losses). 
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medical and economic experts would continue to provide evidence to 
help the fact-finder award compensation for these costs in appropriate 
amounts. The difference would not be in the ability to recover but in 
how the testimony is presented and characterized.219 Instead of 
emphasizing plaintiffs’ impairments, expert testimony would emphasize 
the extraordinary economic costs that the plaintiffs will incur in the 
future. Third party experiential testimony could also provide important 
information about whether the estimates of the plaintiffs’ expenses are 
realistic. Third party experiential experts might testify, for example, 
about whether their own damage awards were adequate to cover their 
medical costs. 
Changing tort litigation’s narrative from pity to rights and 
accountability may pose greater risks to the plaintiff’s recovery of non-
economic or “general” damages.220 Many plaintiffs’ lawyers currently 
believe that presenting plaintiffs as tragedies is essential to maximize 
jury awards for pain and suffering and hedonic damages.221 The problem 
is particularly serious in the presentation of hedonic damage claims.222 In 
presenting these claims, plaintiffs’ lawyers and courts typically suggest 
that a life with a disabling injury is a life without pleasure.223 Because 
the presentation of claims in this way reinforces negative stereotypes 
about disabilities, some disability-rights oriented scholars have argued 
that courts should not compensate for hedonic losses in cases involving 
disabilities.224 
While well-intended, refusing to allow plaintiffs to recover for lost 
pleasures in life is a mistake both analytically and practically. To 
understand why, it is important to separate out the particular types of 
injuries for which plaintiffs are seeking recovery with hedonic damage 
claims. Some claims for hedonic damages seek awards for the hedonic 
losses that plaintiffs incur immediately after the injury.225 Under these 
circumstances, the analysis looks backward and focuses solely on 
                                                     
219. See discussion supra notes 119–129 and accompanying text (arguing that medical damages 
can be presented in alternative ways without posing a risk to recovery). 
220. For an overview of the differences between “economic” and “non-economic” or “general” 
damages, see HASEN, supra note 112, at 37. 
221. Perry, supra note 169, at 984. 
222. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 751.  
223. Id. But see Swedloff & Huang, supra note 60, at 580–83 (arguing that, while courts use the 
language of “loss of enjoyment of life,” hedonic damage awards typically compensate for loss of 
capacity). 
224. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 797.  
225. See Swedloff & Huang, supra note 60, at 585 (discussing the valuation of hedonic damages 
immediately after a plaintiff’s injury). 
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awarding compensation for past losses. As a practical matter, plaintiffs 
deserve compensation for these actual losses that they incurred as a 
result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Moreover, from a disability 
rights perspective, there is no reason not to allow these awards. Awards 
for plaintiffs’ loss of activities in which they once engaged, like 
horseback-riding or canoeing, for example, focus on compensating for 
the loss of particular activities that plaintiffs enjoyed in the past.226 Such 
an award says nothing about plaintiffs’ present or future capacity for 
pleasure and happiness (as a person with disabilities or otherwise), nor 
does it attempt to restore plaintiffs to some prior state that blindsighted 
legal actors presume is superior to plaintiffs’ current state.227 
A similar situation is presented by the question of whether hedonic 
damages should be awarded for lost pleasures experienced by plaintiffs 
during the period after injury and before adaptation.228 During this 
period of adjustment, plaintiffs with disabling injuries typically 
experience a significant overall loss of pleasure in their lives, due to 
defendants’ wrongful conduct.229 Moreover, plaintiffs’ freedom to 
pursue pleasurable activities may also be significantly more limited 
during this period of time because they are busy with medical treatments 
or in too much pain.230 As a practical matter, plaintiffs deserve and 
should receive compensation for lost pleasures that they incur during this 
period of time, just as it is appropriate to compensate them for the loss of 
pleasures that they engaged in before the injury occurred. Moreover, 
because these awards reflect actual hedonic losses, from a disability 
rights perspective, there is no reason not to make the awards. 
Hedonic damage awards become much more problematic, however, 
when courts and plaintiffs’ lawyers characterize the damages as an 
award for future losses and, in particular, for losses associated with legal 
actors’ perceptions of the plaintiffs’ capacity to lead a “normal” life.231 
When courts make hedonic awards on this basis, they are, by definition, 
                                                     
226. See, e.g., Hendrix v. Stepanek, 771 N.E.2d 559, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (upholding an 
award for hedonic damages compensating the plaintiff for the loss of certain activities in her life).  
227. See discussion supra notes 112–120 and accompanying text (describing the problems with a 
backward looking analysis that focuses on restoring the plaintiff to a prior state).  
228. See Swedloff & Huang, supra note 60, at 585 (distinguishing between pre-adaptation and 
post-adaptation losses). 
229. Id.  
230. See, e.g., Poche v. Allstate Ins. Co., 04-CA-1058 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/1/05); 900 So. 2d 55 
(upholding a jury’s award of hedonic damages for the period of thirteen months that the plaintiff 
spent in medical treatment because during this time she could not participate fully in activities that 
she previously enjoyed). 
231. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 797.  
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speculating about plaintiffs’ likely future happiness.232 On the one hand, 
it is appropriate to focus on the plaintiffs’ future and speculate about the 
potential restrictions that plaintiffs may experience on their freedom to 
pursue pleasure. Plaintiffs with disabling injuries should be able to 
recover for all future economic and non-economic injuries that they will 
endure as a consequence of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Where 
current formulations of future hedonic damage claims go wrong is not 
on the emphasis on plaintiffs’ future but in how legal actors analyze and 
perceive plaintiffs’ future. 
Under the current approach, legal actors mistakenly attempt to assess 
the extent of the injury to plaintiffs’ future “enjoyment of life” by 
comparing what plaintiffs are likely to do in the future with what 
plaintiffs did in the past.233 The best example of this is the widespread 
practice of treating the fact of a disabling injury as a proxy for future 
“loss.”234 The only circumstances under which a disabling injury makes 
sense as a proxy for future “loss,” however, is if you view a life with a 
disability as inherently less valuable than a life without one. But, as we 
have seen, this approach to hedonic damages—and hedonic loss—is at 
odds with how people with disabilities actually experience their lives. In 
short, the analysis is problematic on two levels. First, it looks backward 
to speculate on future injury. Second, it relies on a distorted perspective 
of disability to assess the plaintiffs’ future happiness on the basis of this 
backward analysis. 
For similar reasons, awards for future hedonic injuries should also not 
be based on “lost capacity.”235 For one thing, the emphasis on “lost 
capacity” is no less offensive than the practice of using the existence of a 
disability as a proxy for “hedonic loss.”236 More fundamentally—as is 
the case with existence of “disability”—there is no evidence indicating 
that the fact of “lost capacity” will itself lead to “hedonic loss.”237 If 
anything, the evidence may be to the contrary.238 To assume otherwise is 
to assume that future loss can be understood by looking backward. There 
is no evidence, however, that future loss can be meaningfully understood 
                                                     
232. See, e.g., Varnell v. La. Tech Univ., 709 So. 2d 890 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (awarding hedonic 
damages on the ground that the plaintiff did not have “much of a future”). 
233. Id. 
234. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 755–56.  
235. See Swedloff & Huang, supra note 60, at 581–83, 587. 
236. See generally Fordham, supra note 34, at 1512–21. 
237. See generally id. at 1519–20. 
238. See generally id. at 1518 (noting research indicating that some people with severe physical 
disabilities report greater life satisfaction than people without disabling conditions).  
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in this way. 
Thus, a less blindsighted version of hedonic damage claims would 
permit awards for future hedonic injury that, looking forward, reflect the 
cost of placing plaintiffs in the hedonic positions that they would have 
been in but for defendants’ wrongful conduct.239 Juries, for example, 
might award plaintiffs amounts that reflect the costs to plaintiffs of 
overcoming any social or environmental barriers to pleasure that resulted 
from the defendants’ wrongful conduct (including, perhaps, the costs 
associated with the time and effort associated with learning and 
experiencing new pleasures).240 Similarly, plaintiffs should also be able 
to recover for both the economic and noneconomic costs of social 
discrimination and exclusion that they are likely to experience in the 
future.241 
These very serious future injuries are worthy of significant 
compensation. Moreover, the forward-looking focus of the analysis 
changes the narrative in ways that will permit plaintiffs to pursue 
hedonic damage claims for future hedonic injury, without the 
stigmatizing effects of current practices. Specifically, the forward-
looking approach shifts the focus away from biased assessments of 
plaintiffs’ bodies and places more emphasis on plaintiffs’ freedom to 
engage in pleasurable activities, without unwanted interference. Rather 
than requiring plaintiffs to argue that they have lost the capacity to have 
a “normal” life, hedonic damage claims would compensate plaintiffs for 
the defendants’ interference with their right to self-determination and 
liberty in the hedonic realm. 
Framing plaintiffs’ claims in this way also opens up the potential for 
other types of remedies. To give one example, if we focused more on the 
future social harms that are likely to flow from disabling injuries, 
                                                     
239. See discussion supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text (explaining the difference 
between forward looking relief and backward looking relief, in the context of damages). 
240. Some defendants may attempt to argue that they should not be liable for damages stemming 
from social prejudice on the ground their conduct was not the proximate cause of any social 
exclusion. Because social exclusion is an entirely foreseeable result of conduct that leads to a 
disabling injury, however, these arguments should fail. See generally Dobbs, supra note 22, at 443–
45 (providing an overview on the principles of proximate cause). 
241. Bagenstos and Schlanger make a similar argument in the context of economic damages. See 
Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 14, at 791. My argument here is for the recovery of the non-
economic aspects of these future injuries. With the inclusion of testimony from third-party 
experiential experts, both types of compensation—for economic and non-economic costs of social 
harm—will flow more naturally in tort litigation. The downside of this approach is that the 
consideration of future social harm might prompt the jury to blame someone other than the 
defendant for plaintiffs’ injuries. With proper jury instructions, however, the risks can be minimized 
and plaintiffs should be able to recover compensation for the future injuries of social discrimination.  
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plaintiffs rendered disabled by defendants might be able to recover for 
unjust enrichment.242 Unjust enrichment awards compensate plaintiffs 
when defendants unfairly enrich themselves at plaintiffs’ expense.243 
Importantly, damage calculations for unjust enrichment tend to focus on 
defendants’ gain rather than plaintiffs’ losses.244 For example, in other 
contexts, courts have relied on a theory of unjust enrichment to strip 
defendants of benefits obtained unfairly at plaintiffs’ expense.245 In a 
similar way, in the context of torts involving disabling injuries, courts 
might rely on a theory of unjust enrichment to strip the defendants of 
any benefits that they obtained as a result of their wrongful conduct. For 
example, a court might strip a defendant product manufacturer of any 
profits that it obtained as a result of exposing plaintiffs to a product that 
was not sufficiently tested. 
Taking these principles more seriously in tort litigation involving 
disabling injuries might also trigger some interesting conversations 
about other ways in which defendants may benefit from disabling others. 
Some disability rights activists argue, for example, that people without 
disabilities benefit from disabling others because it places people 
without disabilities in a more privileged social and economic position.246 
Legal actors and defendants need to hear these views. These 
conversations, in turn, might eventually prompt damage awards that take 
into account any unfair social and economic advantage that defendants 
gain from plaintiffs’ disablement. 
Reframing narratives in terms of rights and accountability might also 
illuminate the way in which tort litigation’s legal process is itself a form 
of remedy for plaintiffs, with its own rewards and potential impact on 
plaintiffs’ recovery.247 Many scholars have noted the value of 
                                                     
242. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 
(2000); see also James Steven Rogers, Restitution for Wrongs and the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 57 (2007).  
243. See Rogers, supra note 242, at 57.  
244. Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1224 (1995). 
245. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 798, 800–01 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (ordering George Harrison to disgorge twenty-five percent of the profits from the 
hit My Sweet Lord to the plaintiff); Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 287, 173 P.2d 
652, 654 (1947) (ordering defendant to compensate the plaintiff for the amount of labor costs saved 
by the defendant after using plaintiff’s egg washing machine without the plaintiff’s permission).  
246. See Hunt, supra note 47, at 9 (describing the disabling of others as possibly motivated by a 
“need to safeguard” the “security” of those without disabling conditions); see also Jerome McCristal 
Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 1638–40 (1999) (making 
a similar argument in the race context). 
247. For similar arguments in the civil rights context, see Richard Delgado, Storytelling for 
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413–14 (1989); Richard 
 
WLR_Bloom_Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/9/2011 8:26 AM 
752 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:709 
 
storytelling for injured plaintiffs.248 At the same time, some of the most 
financially successful plaintiffs’ lawyers also argue that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers should focus more on understanding plaintiffs’ views of their 
own cases.249 These lawyers claim that listening more carefully to 
plaintiffs’ stories is not only the right thing to do in terms of providing 
meaningful representation to their clients but also more likely to lead to 
successful outcomes for the attorneys.250 
CONCLUSION 
This Article encourages a fundamental revision of the way that tort 
litigation portrays disabilities. It begins with the observation that legal 
actors in tort litigation do not view people with physical disabilities the 
way those individuals view themselves. Although many legal actors 
view disability as a tragedy, most injured plaintiffs adjust to their 
disabilities and go on to lead happy lives. The predisposition to view 
disabilities as tragedies is a form of institutional blindsight. Legal actors 
in tort litigation can physically see disability, but they do not perceive 
disability as individuals actually experience it. 
To address tort litigation’s blindsight, this Article offers several 
proposed changes. First, it argues that we need to be more cautious about 
tort litigation’s current over-reliance on medical experts. Second, the 
Article suggests that tort litigation should focus instead on making more 
space for testimony from plaintiffs and others with similarly disabling 
injuries. Third, the Article calls for changing the way we talk about 
disabilities in tort litigation. Instead of presenting plaintiffs with 
disabling injuries as tragedies, legal actors should reframe the litigation 
in ways that will portray plaintiffs in more empowering ways. One way 
to do this, the Article suggests, is to focus more heavily on defendants’ 
                                                     
Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 95–96 
(1990) [hereinafter Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story]. 
248. Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story, supra note 247, at 95–96; see also Elizabeth Emens, 
Shape Stops Story, NARRATIVE, 2007, at 130–31 (asserting that storytelling can contribute to client 
empowerment but also arguing that sometimes lawyers should protect their clients’ right not to tell a 
story).  
249. See, e.g., GERRY SPENCE, GIVE ME LIBERTY!: FREEING OURSELVES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 304–05 (1998) (describing the methods taught at Spence’s trial lawyer college, including 
how to “crawl into the hides” of clients, “experience their pain,” and understand their witness); see 
also Dana K. Cole, Psychodrama and the Training of Trial Lawyers: Finding the Story, 21 N. ILL. 
U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2001) (describing Spence’s techniques, which encourage intense client 
identification). 
250. Cole, supra note 249, at 22; see also Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: 
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485, 564–65 (1994). 
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interference with plaintiffs’ liberty, while placing less emphasis on 
plaintiffs’ bodies.  If we can make these changes, tort litigation will be 
able to play a more empowering role in the lives of plaintiffs and 
contribute more constructively to our understanding of how disability is 
produced. 
 
